Griffiths, R v

For historic sexual offences, sentence is imposed under the regime current at sentencing, but no individual term may exceed the maximum available when the offence was committed. The court should make measured reference to guidelines for equivalent modern offences. Seriousness, assessed through culpability and harm, remains the principal consideration.

Where historic offending comprises multiple serious assaults, consecutive sentences may reflect the total criminality, including incidents subsumed within a multiple-incident count. The ordinary principles concerning maximum sentences and mitigation do not prevent that result where the governing historic-offence approach justifies it.

The appellant, a former church rector, was convicted at Portsmouth Crown Court of four historic offences of indecent assault contrary to Sexual Offences Act 1956, section 14(1). The offences, committed between 1975 and 1982 against two parishioners, involved a grave abuse of pastoral trust and caused lasting harm.

On 21 February 2020, the judge imposed consecutive terms of two years’ imprisonment on each count, totalling eight years. The appellant appealed against sentence, contending that the maximum terms and consecutive structure were manifestly excessive and insufficiently reflected mitigation and totality.

A further issue concerned the statutory requirement to identify in open court detention awaiting extradition and qualifying-curfew credit.

1. Appeal dismissed. The total sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was just and proportionate. Each individual term remained within the two-year maximum available when the historic offences were committed.

2. The applicable approach was the Sentencing Council guidance on historic sexual offending, consistently with R v H and others [2011] EWCA Crim 2753. Sentence was to be imposed under the regime current at sentencing, subject to the historic statutory maximum. The court was entitled to make measured reference to guidelines for equivalent offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, to reflect present-day standards and attitudes.

3. The sentencing judge had overstated the present-day guideline starting point for the conduct in count 5. Since it involved no penetration, the equivalent section 4 offence had a starting point of two years and a range of one to four years. That correction did not render the overall sentence excessive.

4. The appellant’s culpability was high. He used his apparent respectability and spiritual position to facilitate the abuse, and both victims continued to suffer its serious and lifelong effects. His age, frailty, lack of convictions and personal circumstances attracted sympathy, but carried little weight against the gravity of the offending.

5. The ordinary propositions that a maximum sentence is generally reserved for the most serious offending and is unusual where genuine mitigation exists did not govern the result. The historic-offence guidance did. The multiple-incident count represented at least five assaults, so the appellant had committed at least eight assaults in total. Consecutive sentences properly reflected that overall criminality and complied with totality.

6. The Crown Court had not separately announced the required extradition and qualifying-curfew days. The court regularised the position: 430 days’ extradition detention were to count, and 135 qualifying-curfew days gave 68 days’ credit. Remand custody in England counted automatically. Subject to those clarifications, the appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2020] EWCA Crim 732, dismissed the appeal against sentence, while regularising the calculation and announcement of extradition and qualifying-curfew credit.
• Crown Court at Portsmouth — On 13 January 2020, convicted the appellant of four offences of indecent assault. On 21 February 2020, imposed four consecutive terms of two years’ imprisonment, totalling eight years.