Ibrahim, R. v

A jury should be discharged only where a high degree of need arises. The decision is entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion. On an appeal against conviction following a jury irregularity, the question is whether the judge’s exercise of that discretion was plainly wrong or irrational so that the conviction is unsafe.

A judge may continue a trial after investigating the extent of jurors’ exposure to extraneous material, obtaining their assurances of impartiality, and giving clear directions to decide the case only on the evidence. The later removal of one defendant does not itself make the remaining convictions unsafe where the direction neutralises any prejudice and the jury demonstrates that it can assess each defendant separately.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of attempted murder and possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. He received an extended sentence for attempted murder and a concurrent sentence for the firearm offence.

During the defence case, a juror reported overhearing Newman’s alibi witness on a bus and believing that she had said she had lied in court. The trial judge discharged that juror, investigated the knowledge and impartiality of the remaining jurors, and later discharged the jury from returning a verdict on Newman alone. The trial continued against the appellant and the other defendants with directions to decide the case solely on the evidence.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the whole jury should have been discharged because the incident and Newman’s removal made his convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. A jury should not be discharged unless a high degree of need arises. The decision is discretionary. Applying R v Winsor [1866] Law Reports 1 QB 289, the appellate question was whether the judge’s rulings were plainly wrong or irrational so as to render the convictions unsafe.

2. The judge correctly discharged Juror 3. He was also entitled to conclude that the trial could continue with the remaining 11 jurors. He investigated what each juror knew, asked those with knowledge whether they could remain objective, and had no sound reason to reject their assurances. The judge’s comments speculating about Juror 3’s likely influence were unfortunate, but played no real part in the decision.

3. The subsequent removal of Newman from the jury’s consideration was unnecessary, and could have suggested that his case was tainted. Nevertheless, it was not irrational or plainly wrong when viewed with the judge’s clear direction that the remaining defendants’ cases had to be decided only on the evidence.

4. Newman’s alibi was distinct from the appellant’s. Moreover, two co-defendants who had advanced the same alibi as the appellant were acquitted. That outcome materially supported the conclusion that the jury had followed the direction and had discriminated between the defendants. The appellant’s contrary case depended on inappropriate speculation. The safety of the convictions did not depend on assessing the strength of the prosecution case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2020] EWCA Crim 834.

• Central Criminal Court: on 26 June 2019, the appellant was convicted of attempted murder and possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. On 12 September 2019, he received an extended sentence under section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.