Hanson v Associated Newspapers Ltd

In determining whether defamatory words convey fact or opinion, the court must assess the publication as a whole and in context. The distinction is fact-sensitive and should not be approached through rigid or formulaic rules. An expression of opinion must be recognisable as comment and must indicate, generally or specifically, the basis on which it is expressed. The words “I believe” do not, without more, turn an allegation of fact into opinion. A publication may contain factual allegations which are not independently defamatory, while its overall defamatory character is supplied by an opinion based on those facts.

The claimant, a clinical psychologist, brought a libel claim concerning a Mail on Sunday article about the false allegations made by Carl Beech and the roles of psychotherapists and police investigators. The parties agreed that the court should determine as preliminary issues the article’s natural and ordinary meaning, whether its statements were fact or opinion, and whether any opinion indicated its basis.

No oral hearing took place. The claimant accepted that the article indicated the basis of any defamatory opinion. The court therefore determined the first two issues and also addressed whether the factual allegations were independently defamatory.

1. Applicable approach. The principles in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 25 governed meaning and the fact/opinion distinction. The court had to consider the article as a whole and in context, while avoiding an over-rigid or over-analytical approach. The warning in British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2011] 1 WLR 133, as explained in Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 1234 (QB), was material.
2. Under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, honest opinion requires a statement of opinion, an indication of its basis, and the possibility that an honest person could have held the opinion on the facts or privileged assertions available at publication. Only the first two conditions required determination. The second condition requires the reader to understand what the comment concerns and permits the commentator to explain its subject matter and reasons, consistently with Peck v Williams Trade Supplies Ltd [2020] EWHC 966 (QB).
3. The article’s natural and ordinary meaning was that the claimant had, through her support for Vicki Paterson, her alleged subscription to the belief that abuse complainants must be believed, and her association with Beech, demonstrated poor professional judgment and given unjustified credibility to his fantasies. It also conveyed that accepting an advisory role on Operation Conifer, after her statement about Sir Edward Heath, demonstrated lack of impartiality and prejudgment. The court separated the factual allegations from the opinions expressed about them.
4. The underlined passages were opinions; the balance consisted of factual allegations. The facts were not independently defamatory. The meaning as a whole was defamatory because the defamatory element was supplied by the opinions. The word “apparent” was removed from the proposed meaning because it impermissibly lowered or altered the meaning. The words “I believe” did not convert an otherwise factual allegation into opinion.
5. The claimant accepted that the article indicated, in general terms, the basis of the opinions. The first and second preliminary issues were determined in accordance with the court’s formulated meaning and classification.