Sykes v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Anor

A temporary planning permission should not be granted merely because there is an unmet need for traveller sites. The likelihood of suitable accommodation becoming available by the end of the temporary period must be assessed on the evidence in the particular case. A temporary permission must not postpone a difficult decision on permanent permission.

In a Green Belt case, the harm caused by the development may remain decisive even where need, personal circumstances and Article 8 rights carry significant weight. The court will not reweigh planning considerations under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Reasons must be read fairly and as a whole, and a reasons challenge requires substantial prejudice.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an Inspector’s dismissal of an appeal against refusal of retrospective permission for a 13-pitch residential traveller site in the Green Belt. The claimant accepted that the refusal of permanent permission could not be challenged and confined the claim to temporary permission.

The Secretary of State conceded that the Inspector had not adequately addressed whether suitable permanent sites might become available in neighbouring areas. The claimant pursued challenges concerning accommodation elsewhere in Surrey, a period of at least four years, the availability of accommodation at the end of the temporary period, and whether permission should have been considered for fewer pitches.

1. The application was dismissed. The claimant did not establish an unlawful failure to take account of a material consideration, inadequate reasons, or an error in the Inspector’s treatment of a reduced scheme.

2. Following Beaver v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and South Cambridgeshire District Council [2015] EWHC 1774 (Admin), the existence of an unmet need did not justify assuming that the local planning authority would overcome that shortfall during the temporary permission period. The likelihood of suitable accommodation becoming available had to be decided on the actual evidence. Temporary permission was not a device for avoiding the permanent planning decision. That principle applied with particular force in the Green Belt.

3. The Inspector was entitled to focus on the position in Runnymede. The possibility of suitable accommodation elsewhere in Surrey had not been properly raised until closing submissions and was unsupported by the necessary evidence. The Inspector had not overlooked the point, so Ground 3 failed. His reasons were technically defective because he did not explain why the issue could not properly be raised at that late stage, but the decision was not quashed on that basis.

4. The Inspector’s reference to the end of a four-year period did not substantially prejudice the claimant. The evidence and the Inspector’s findings showed that the Council’s proposed provision would not meet the identified need even over five years. In any event, the Inspector had given an additional and independently sufficient reason: reducing Green Belt harm by time-limiting permission would not make the harm clearly outweighed by the other considerations.

5. The reasons for concluding that suitable accommodation would not be available for all or most households were adequate and intelligible. The Inspector had explained the extent of need, the unreliability of proposed supply, and the non-deliverability of the Council’s proposed pitches. Any deficiency would not have caused substantial prejudice.

6. The Inspector was entitled to address a reduced number of pitches in general terms because no alternative scheme, plans, household numbers, access arrangements, infrastructure or draft conditions had been submitted. His planning judgment that a reduced scheme would still require significant infrastructure and cause unacceptable Green Belt harm was not open to challenge as a merits appeal.

7. The Inspector had considered the personal circumstances of the prospective occupiers individually and collectively, the best interests of affected children, and Article 8 rights. He was entitled to conclude that protection of the Green Belt was a legitimate objective and that the interference with Article 8 rights was proportionate and necessary.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate decision. It concerns a statutory challenge to an Inspector’s decision dated 9 May 2019.