Mohammed v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Interim relief in a public law claim may be decisive of the practical issue in dispute. In such a case, the court may examine the apparent strength of the claim when assessing the balance of convenience or justice, although this is not a universal requirement. In immigration detention cases, the court must apply the objective Hardial Singh principles, recognising that the state must justify detention and that individual liberty requires anxious scrutiny. Contemporaneous detention reviews may assist the court but do not replace its own assessment. Mental health evidence and the Secretary of State’s published detention policy may bear both on the apparent merits and on the public interest balance. Release may be ordered as interim relief without determining whether detention is substantively unlawful.

The claimant sought interim relief requiring his release from immigration detention. The claim also included a damages claim, which the parties agreed should be transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division. The application was heard by telephone during the coronavirus pandemic.

The claimant had been detained for approximately 11 months. His fresh claim had not yet been decided, and any adverse decision was likely to lead to further appellate or judicial review proceedings. The court considered the apparent application of the third Hardial Singh principle, the claimant’s assessed risks, medical evidence of severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and the policy guidance Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention.

1. Interim relief. The application involved two stages: whether there was a serious issue to be tried and, secondly, the balance of convenience or justice, including the public interest. The serious-issue threshold was accepted. Because interim relief was likely to determine whether the claimant remained detained or was released, it was appropriate to examine the apparent strength of the claim. That approach was fact-sensitive and not a general rule for every interim application.
2. Hardial Singh principle. The third principle requires detention to cease where it becomes apparent that removal cannot be effected within a reasonable period. The assessment is objective and ultimately for the court. The claimant’s existing detention, the uncertain timetable for deciding the fresh claim, and the likely further litigation meant that there was a strong claim on the face of the materials. The risks of absconding, reoffending and harm were important, but did not answer the reasonable-period question.
3. Contemporaneous evidence. Detention reviews and authorising officers’ assessments could assist the court, particularly where reasoned and convincing. Here, the January and March assessments supporting a release referral were more convincing than the unexplained decision preventing release. They did not displace the court’s independent application of the legal principles.
4. Mental health and policy. The medical evidence materially reinforced the claim and the balance of justice. It supported, on its face, treating the claimant as a level 3 case under the published Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention guidance. The evidence was relevant both to the reasonable-period principle and to the public interest balance.
5. Order. The balance of justice favoured release despite the legitimate public protection concerns. The court ordered interim release without deciding the substantive lawfulness of detention. The Secretary of State could use the bail powers in Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 and impose appropriate conditions. Release was directed by noon on 2 April 2020. The damages claim was transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division, with costs reserved.

The judgment does not state an appellate history. The application followed directions given by Mrs Justice Knowles on 11 March 2020 and a consent order in earlier judicial review proceedings dated 25 November 2019.