Ivanchev v Velli

For service of a claim form on an individual, the usual or last known residence must be a place where the defendant has lived. An address cannot qualify merely because the claimant honestly or reasonably believes it to be the defendant’s residence.

Where the claimant has reason to believe that the defendant no longer lives at the address, reasonable steps must be taken to ascertain the current residence. If that cannot be done, the claimant must consider alternative service and, where appropriate, apply under the relevant procedural rule. In a multiple-occupancy building, service is fact-sensitive and evidence that documents were left somewhere in the building may be insufficient.

The claimant brought proceedings for libel, harassment, misuse of private information and breach of data protection rights. He sought default judgment and a final injunction, alleging that the defendant operated an email account and had sent defamatory material.

The claim was issued against names which did not identify the defendant, and the claim form was first posted to an apartment in the defendant’s building where he had never lived. A later process server left documents somewhere in the development, but could not identify the apartment or mailbox. The defendant denied service, established his correct identity and stated that he wished to defend the claim.

The central issue was whether the claim form and particulars of claim had been validly served under the Civil Procedure Rules.

1. Application dismissed. The claim form and particulars of claim had not been served, so the claimant’s application for default judgment under CPR rules 12.3(1) and 12.4(2) failed.
2. Under CPR rule 6.9, service on an individual ordinarily requires service at the defendant’s usual or last known residence. The good arguable case threshold requires the claimant to have a much better argument on the available material than the defendant. However, the address must in fact have been a residence of the defendant. It cannot be transformed into a last known residence by an honestly held or reasonably acquired but false belief.
3. The first service attempt, at apartment 1607, was ineffective because the defendant had never lived there. The second attempt also failed. Although the documents may have been delivered to a mailbox within the defendant’s building, the evidence did not establish that the mailbox belonged to his usual residence, apartment 406. The building contained many autonomous flats, each with a separate mailbox and postal address, and the documents were incorrectly addressed.
4. By the time of the second attempt, the claimant had reason to believe that the defendant did not live at apartment 1607. CPR rules 6.9(3) and 6.9(4)(a) therefore required reasonable steps to ascertain the defendant’s current address. Speaking to security staff did not achieve that result. The claimant should at least have contacted the defendant again and, if necessary, applied under CPR rule 6.15 for alternative service, as previously proposed.
5. The court declined to dispense with service. The claimant first needed to decide whether to amend the defendant’s incorrect name. Pursuant to CPR rule 3.1(2)(a), time for service was extended by one month, to 22 September 2020. Permission was granted under CPR rule 6.15 to serve the claim form and particulars by email at the address used by the defendant.