Halal Meat Sellers Committee Ltd & Anor v HMC (UK) Ltd

A claim may be struck out where the pleaded facts, assumed to be true, disclose no legally recognisable cause of action. The court may determine a clear question of law summarily, but disputed facts are ordinarily assumed in the claimant’s favour unless the evidence is exceptionally improbable. A charity promoting a sincerely held interpretation of religious dietary requirements does not, merely because other interpretations exist, act outside its charitable objects. Contractual conditions governing access to a voluntary accreditation scheme are not necessarily restraints of trade, particularly where the defendant does not trade in the relevant goods and the conditions last only while accreditation continues. Natural justice does not ordinarily govern the contractual creation of accreditation rights.

HMC operated a voluntary accreditation and certification scheme for non-stunned Halal meat. Accredited butchers could use HMC’s certificate, sticker, logo and related benefits only if they did not sell fresh meat from slaughterhouses not approved by HMC.

The claimants, representing Halal meat businesses, sought declarations that this restriction was outside HMC’s charitable objects, an unreasonable restraint of trade, and contrary to natural justice. HMC applied under CPR rule 3.4(2) to strike out the Part 8 claim. The central issues were whether the pleaded case disclosed a legally recognisable claim and whether the court should permit the claim to continue as a Part 7 claim.

1. Strike-out test. The court granted HMC’s application under CPR rule 3.4(2)(a). A claim may be struck out because it is vague, incoherent or incomplete, or because coherent pleaded facts would not establish a legally recognisable claim. Clear questions of law may be decided summarily. Where facts are genuinely disputed, they should ordinarily be assumed in favour of the claimant unless the evidence is so improbable that it can safely be rejected before trial.
2. Charitable objects. The pleaded complaint was founded on a disagreement about the proper interpretation of Islamic dietary law. HMC sincerely promoted its own interpretation. The existence of other interpretations, even a majority interpretation, did not establish that HMC was acting outside its charitable purposes. The court was not required to adjudicate the truth of competing religious doctrines. HMC’s charitable objects did not alter the contractual arrangements, and the claimants identified no contractual term requiring HMC to adopt their interpretation.
3. Restraint of trade. The accreditation contract was not a restraint of trade. HMC was a charity providing certification services, not a trader in meat. Butchers were free not to become accredited, to end accreditation, and to sell HMC or other products thereafter. The restriction concerned only the conditions for using HMC’s accreditation and lasted only during the contractual relationship. The judge added that, if the contract were a restraint, its reasonableness could not be finally determined without a trial.
4. Natural justice. The claim was inadequately pleaded. A contractual condition governing entitlement to accreditation was not, on the pleaded case, a decision amenable to objection for breach of natural justice. A contractual discretion might require non-arbitrary or reasonable exercise, but that was not the claim advanced.
5. Other grounds. The court did not find abuse of process or a sufficient procedural failure. Absence of a pre-action letter, use of Part 8 where factual issues existed, and the representative-proceedings objection did not justify striking out. The application to treat the claim as a Part 7 claim was dismissed.