Desmond Campbell v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

A lawful forfeiture under the proceeds of crime statutory scheme cannot be indirectly reversed through private-law damages claims based on alleged impropriety in anterior steps. Such claims may constitute an abuse of process and disclose no recoverable economic loss where they seek the return of money lawfully forfeited.

An arresting officer may use simple, non-technical language, provided it communicates the essential legal and factual grounds for arrest. A claim for assault remains subject to the statutory limitation regime; reliance on Article 3 does not itself extend or disapply the applicable limitation period.

Mr Campbell sought permission to appeal against HHJ Saggerson’s judgment and order striking out three private-law claims against the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. The claims concerned economic losses associated with the seizure and forfeiture of cash, an alleged fraud on the court, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and assault.

The claims followed earlier public-law proceedings concerning the proceeds of crime process. Goss J had rejected the challenges, and the Court of Appeal had held that the lawfulness of the ultimate forfeiture order could not be undermined by alleged impropriety in anterior steps. The central question was whether any properly arguable ground of appeal remained.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Economic claims. The court upheld the judge’s substance-based approach to the strike-out applications under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The public-law proceedings had provided an opportunity to challenge both the ultimate forfeiture and anterior steps. The Court of Appeal had determined that the ultimate forfeiture, being lawful, fair and justified under the statutory scheme, was impervious to challenge by reference to anterior impropriety.
2. Private-law claims seeking damages equivalent to the forfeited cash or related costs would therefore amount to a collateral or direct attack on the forfeiture orders. They would reverse the statutory divestment indirectly and undermine the legal policy underlying the proceeds of crime scheme. No sustainable private-law cause of action or recoverable economic loss was disclosed.
3. Alleged fraud. The court accepted, without deciding, that a freestanding fraud claim supported by genuinely fresh evidence might in principle be available. The documents relied on had all been available before the forfeiture hearing and could have been deployed there and in the public-law challenges. The pleaded admissions did not amount to admissions of fraud, and no arguable fraud on the court was shown.
4. Personal claims. False imprisonment was parasitic on wrongful arrest. The contention that describing the suspected offence as money-laundering made the arrest unlawful was unsustainable. The authorities establish that simple, non-technical language is sufficient where it communicates the essential legal and factual grounds for arrest.
5. The assault claim was properly struck out as statute-barred. The judge had considered the applicable limitation period and the relevant factors under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. Reliance on Article 3 of Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 did not alter that conclusion or provide a basis for extending the limitation period.

There was no properly arguable error of law. Permission to appeal was refused, with no order as to costs.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): permission to appeal against HHJ Saggerson’s judgment and order was refused.
• Earlier proceedings: the judgment records public-law decisions by Goss J and the Court of Appeal, including [2015] EWHC 3424 (Admin) and [2017] EWCA Civ 1161. Those decisions formed part of the procedural background but were decisions in the same litigation.