Abbassy v Comr of Police of the Metropolis

The legality of an arrest without warrant depends on whether the arrested person was informed, in substance and in non-technical language, of the true reason for it. The issue is ordinarily for the jury, judged objectively in light of the circumstances and information reasonably available to the constable. A judge may withdraw it only where the evidence cannot support an adequate explanation. A constable need not identify the precise statutory power or choose between alternative arrestable offences. In jury trials for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, the established practice of giving general guidance on damages remains applicable under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Findings of assault and rejection of deliberate falsification are not necessarily inconsistent.

The plaintiffs sued police officers after Mr Abbassy was arrested following questions about his authority to drive a Mercedes, and Mrs Abbassy was arrested after intervening. They alleged false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution. Leonard J. ruled that Mr Abbassy had not been adequately informed of the reason for his arrest, rendering both arrests unlawful, and directed the jury on damages and malicious prosecution. The jury awarded damages for false imprisonment and one assault but rejected malicious prosecution. The defendants appealed on the arrest ruling and damages. Mrs Abbassy cross-appealed on the alleged inconsistency between the jury’s answers. The central issues were whether the explanation should have gone to the jury, whether the damages guidance was adequate, and whether the verdicts were inconsistent.

Disposition. Lord Justice Woolf gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Mustill agreed, and Lord Justice Purchas agreed with the result and added reasons. The appeal was allowed only in relation to the false imprisonment cause of action. The judgment in favour of the plaintiffs on that issue was set aside and a new trial was ordered on false imprisonment alone. The cross-appeal was dismissed.

1. Reason for arrest. The common law requires a person arrested without warrant to be informed of the true ground of arrest in substance. The explanation need not identify the precise statutory power, use technical language or formulate the eventual charge. Its adequacy must be assessed objectively, having regard to all the background circumstances and the information reasonably available to the officer. The approach in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 supplied the governing guidance, and Wheatley v Lodge [1971] 1 WLR 29 illustrated the objective standard.
2. The adequacy of the explanation was ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. The judge could withdraw it only if, even on the defendants’ evidence, the explanation was incapable of being adequate. The questions about ownership, the warning of arrest and the reference to the vehicle meant that a properly directed jury could find that unlawful possession conveyed, in commonplace terms, the suspected offence of unlawfully taking and driving away the vehicle. The officer did not have to choose between alternative arrestable offences. Leonard J. therefore erred in deciding the issue as one of law. The pleaded case was properly treated as relying on the Criminal Law Act 1967, rather than the unpleaded section 66 power under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839.
3. Damages. The court endorsed the desirability of better assistance to juries, referring to Every v Miles (C.A. No.261) and Wright v The British Railways Board [1983] 2 AC 773. However, Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273 established that the existing practice of giving general guidance should continue. Section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 preserved the relevant right to jury trial. The judge’s direction could not be faulted, and the awards did not fall within the limited category in which the Court of Appeal could intervene.
4. Inconsistent answers. The agreed third question was directed to whether the police accounts were deliberately and knowingly false in the context of the malicious prosecution claim. A finding that one officer had assaulted Mr Abbassy showed only that her account was not wholly accurate. It did not itself establish malicious prosecution or make the jury’s answers inconsistent.

The remaining verdicts were left standing. Costs orders in favour of the police were made subject to leave of the court, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal: [1989] EWCA Civ 7. Appeal allowed on the false imprisonment issue alone, with a retrial ordered; cross-appeal dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Leonard J. ruled that the explanation given for Mr Abbassy’s arrest was legally inadequate, found both arrests unlawful, and left damages and malicious prosecution issues to the jury.