NCL v MME

An interim injunction may restrain publication where the claimant has a strong case that publication would disclose private information or identify a complainant of a sexual offence contrary to the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. Anonymity is justified where naming the claimant would defeat the proceedings or contravene the statutory anonymity protection. Without-notice relief requires compelling reasons under section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The claimant must also show that she is likely to succeed at trial. Serious, extensive and disproportionate intrusion into private life will generally outweigh weak claims of public interest. Damages may be inadequate where publication would cause irreversible personal harm.

The claimant sought, without notice, an interim injunction restraining the defendant from publishing and selling a self-published book. She alleged that the book disclosed substantial private information about their former relationship and identified her as a complainant of a sexual offence, engaging her statutory lifelong anonymity. The defendant was not represented.

The claimant also sought anonymity and restrictions on access to statements of case and witness statements. The court had to determine whether notice should be dispensed with, whether publication was likely to be restrained at trial, whether damages would be adequate, and whether delay affected the application.

1. Orders. The injunction was granted. The claimant was granted anonymity, and access by non-parties to statements of case and witness statements was restricted without further order.
2. Anonymity and open justice. Anonymity is an exception to open justice and requires strict necessity. That requirement was met because naming the claimant would defeat the object of the proceedings and frustrate the administration of justice. It would also identify her as the complainant of a sexual offence, contrary to section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.
3. Without-notice relief. Under CPR r.25.3(1) and section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the claimant bore the burden of showing good and compelling reasons for proceeding without notice. The defendant’s apparent authorship, the book’s disclosure of private information, and evidence of hostility towards the claimant established a sufficient real risk that notice would defeat the purpose of the order. A super-injunction was unnecessary.
4. Statutory anonymity. Section 1 of the 1992 Act extends to jigsaw identification and applies regardless of the means or identity of the publisher. The book was likely to identify the claimant through its combination of personal and employment details. The claimant therefore had a strong case that continued publication breached section 1.
5. Privacy and freedom of expression. The claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information disclosed. The fact that the book had already been available for sale for a short period did not defeat that expectation. Applying section 12(3) and (4) of the 1998 Act, the claimant was more likely than not to succeed at trial. The intrusion was serious, extensive and disproportionate to any legitimate publishing purpose. The asserted public interest in exposing corruption or a miscarriage of justice was unpersuasive, and did not justify the salacious detail.
6. Adequacy of damages and delay. Damages would not adequately compensate the claimant for the harm caused by disclosure of private information. A short delay in marketing the book was likely to cause the defendant, at most, modest financial harm. The claimant had acted promptly in the circumstances, so delay was not a reason to refuse relief.