STEPHEN BULLMAN v HIGH COURT IN DUBLIN (IRELAND)

In extradition proceedings, delay will bar surrender only where, viewed overall, it makes extradition unjust or oppressive. “Unjust” principally concerns prejudice to the fairness of trial; “oppressive” concerns hardship caused by changes in the requested person’s circumstances. The seriousness of the alleged offence and the public interest in prosecution remain important factors.

Where the requesting state is an ECHR contracting state with a comparable judicial system, its courts may generally be trusted to address trial prejudice and abuse of process. Article 8 and oppression require a multifactorial evaluation. Section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 is fact-sensitive, but ordinary health, cognitive and support needs will not suffice without cogent evidence that appropriate care cannot be provided.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision ordering his extradition to Ireland for trial on three allegations of rape dating from 2001.

He argued that delay made extradition unjust or oppressive under section 14, that surrender would disproportionately interfere with his Article 8 rights under section 21A, and that his physical and mental condition made extradition unjust or oppressive under section 25. The District Judge rejected those arguments. The central issues were whether the delay created a sufficiently unfair trial risk or oppressive hardship, and whether the appellant’s health and circumstances justified refusing extradition.

1. Appeal dismissed. Grounds based on oppression, Article 8 and ill health failed. Permission to rely on late fresh evidence was refused because it could not have altered the result.
2. Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, “unjust” principally addresses prejudice to the conduct of the trial, while “oppressive” addresses hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances during the relevant period. The assessment is an overall judgment and is not governed by rigid rules. The test is not easily satisfied, and the seriousness of the offence is relevant.
3. The Irish courts were better placed to assess the effect of delay, having access to the complete evidence and submissions. They could exclude an interview statement if its admission would be unfair and could stay proceedings for abuse of process. The material before the English court did not establish that a stay was more likely than not.
4. The District Judge was entitled to weigh culpable delay, the appellant’s life and support arrangements in the United Kingdom, his health, and the effects of surrender against the very high public interest in trying three exceptionally serious allegations of rape. The Article 8 and section 14 conclusions were properly open to him. The later deterioration in the appellant’s health did not change that balance.
5. Section 25 is fact-sensitive. The evidence did not cogently show a significant self-harm or suicide risk, or that Irish prison authorities would be unable to provide appropriate treatment and assistance for the appellant’s depression, anxiety, cognitive difficulties, personality disorders and impaired vision. Ireland’s status as an ECHR contracting state supported the presumption that suitable medical care would be provided.
6. The existing reporting restriction protecting the complainant’s identity was extended. The appellant’s name was not anonymised: Irish anonymity rules did not govern English extradition proceedings, and the evidence did not show a sufficiently real risk of indirect identification or the compelling justification required at the appellate stage.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision of 26 March 2021 dismissed.