Glenn v Kline

On an application for default judgment, the court ordinarily proceeds on the claimant’s pleaded, unchallenged facts. Evidence on the merits is generally unnecessary. The court must nevertheless assess the judgment to which the claimant is entitled and may depart from that approach where the pleaded case is legally defective or plainly untenable.

Default judgment is final unless set aside. The restriction in Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3), applies to interim restraints before trial and does not require a further merits assessment after final default judgment. Any final injunction must remain proportionate, clear, readily comprehensible and limited to the publications or conduct established by the pleaded case. Harassment injunctions require particular care because whether conduct amounts to harassment is fact-sensitive.

The claimant, formerly Chief Executive Officer of the Football Association, brought claims in libel and harassment arising principally from the defendant’s Twitter posts and emails. The defendant had invited the claimant to sue but failed to file an Acknowledgement of Service or Defence after service of the claim.

The claimant applied for judgment in default and consequential relief, including a permanent injunction. The defendant sought an adjournment, relying on lack of preparation, other litigation and the Covid-19 pandemic. The central issues were whether the hearing should be adjourned, whether the conditions for default judgment were satisfied, and what injunction, if any, should be granted.

1. Adjournment. The application was refused. The defendant had ample time to read the Particulars of Claim, obtain representation and file an Acknowledgement of Service. The limited information about other proceedings did not permit any proper assessment of consolidation. The Covid-19 pandemic did not justify an adjournment in circumstances where the courts continued to operate and the relevant procedural steps were straightforward.
2. Default judgment. Under CPR 12.11(1), the court gives such judgment as appears appropriate on the claimant’s statement of case. The pleaded facts are treated as established, and evidence on the merits is normally unnecessary. The court must assess the precise relief to which the claimant is entitled. Departure from the usual approach may be required where the pleaded meanings are wildly extravagant, impossible, clearly non-defamatory or otherwise reveal a patent legal flaw. The principles in Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises [2011] 1 WLR 1978, QRS v Beach [2015] 1 WLR 2701, Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69 and Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB) were applied.
3. The claimant’s pleaded meanings were seriously defamatory and the harassment claim disclosed an arguable course of conduct. The conditions for default judgment were therefore satisfied.
4. Injunction. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 had to be considered, but section 12(3) was not engaged because default judgment was final and there would be no trial. The injunction nevertheless had to be necessary and proportionate. A restraint on further publications was justified by the risk of repetition and was limited to the pleaded defamatory allegations.
5. Final injunctions must be drafted clearly and in terms that a layperson can understand. The fact-sensitive nature of harassment means that an order must identify the prohibited acts rather than leave the defendant to decide at his peril what conduct amounts to harassment. The principles stated in Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] 1 WLR 417 and Boyd v Ineos Upstream Ltd [2019] 4 WLR 100 applied.
6. Judgment in default was entered. The injunction’s final wording was to be agreed or determined in simplified terms. Assessment of damages and any application under section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013 were adjourned. The defendant remained entitled to apply under CPR 13.3 to set aside the default judgment.