Tate v Allianz Iard SA

Articles 29 and 30 of Brussels 1 recast require an extant concurrent proceeding in another Member State. A final judgment, even if it preserves a claimant’s right to bring fresh proceedings for later deterioration, does not create lis pendens. The rationale of avoiding irreconcilable judgments cannot replace the statutory conditions for applying the lis pendens provisions.

For Article 29, proceedings concerning an original injury claim and a later claim for aggravation do not have the same object where the later claim seeks compensation only for the aggravation. The concepts of lis pendens, cause and object are autonomous European law concepts, although national law may provide relevant evidence.

The claimant, injured in France in 1991, obtained compensation from the French courts in proceedings against the bus company responsible. The French Court of Appeal reserved his rights to make a further claim if his condition worsened. After a hip replacement and medical assessment of deterioration, he brought a direct claim in England against the defendant’s insurer for additional damages.

The defendant applied under Articles 29 and 30 of Brussels 1 recast, arguing that French proceedings remained pending or were sufficiently related to require the English action to be stayed or dismissed. The central issues were whether there was a pending French action and whether the proceedings involved the same cause of action or related claims.

The application to decline jurisdiction or, alternatively, stay the proceedings was refused.

1. Pending action. Articles 29 and 30 require a concurrent, extant action in the court first seised. Proceedings terminated by judgment do not remain pending merely because the claimant retains a substantive right to bring a later claim.
2. The French judgments were final. They were not analogous to an award of provisional damages under section 32A of the Senior Courts Act 1981, where the same proceedings remain open for further damages, nor to an order containing liberty to apply. The French aggravation claim was free-standing, required no reservation or permission, and would have to be commenced as fresh proceedings.
3. The concepts of lis pendens and the same cause of action have autonomous European law meanings. National law is not determinative, but the French procedural position was powerful evidence that the original proceedings had ended.
4. The rationale of avoiding irreconcilable or inconsistent judgments could not itself establish the conditions for jurisdictional exclusion. The English court would decide only the discrete aggravation claim, while matters determined by the French courts were res judicata.
5. In any event, the claims did not have the same object for Article 29. The original proceedings sought compensation for the original injury and its consequences; the English proceedings sought damages for subsequent aggravation. There was consequently no relevant risk of irreconcilable judgments. Article 30 was likewise not engaged.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision in the same proceedings was stated.