M, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Newham

Under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, a housing authority must secure suitable accommodation for an applicant owed the homelessness duty. Accommodation may be suitable temporarily even though it would not be reasonable to occupy it indefinitely. Suitability is therefore time-sensitive and fact-sensitive.

Once accommodation is accepted or established to be unsuitable, the authority is in breach unless it can properly rely on a different decision that the accommodation remains suitable for the time being. Delay, resource constraints and housing shortages may be relevant to relief and to whether a mandatory order would require the impossible, but they do not qualify the statutory duty itself. The passage of time may make accommodation unsuitable without proof of a deterioration in circumstances.

The claimant and his family were owed the duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. The family remained in temporary accommodation which lacked bathroom facilities capable of meeting the needs of the claimant’s disabled daughter.

Following a statutory review, the defendant concluded on 27 February 2018 that the accommodation was not suitable. Nevertheless, the family remained there for more than two years without suitable alternative accommodation being provided.

The claim sought a declaration and mandatory order. The central issues were whether the defendant was in breach of section 193(2), whether the review decision amounted to an admission of breach, and whether relief should be granted.

1. Claim succeeded. The defendant was in breach of its duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. A mandatory order was made requiring it to secure suitable accommodation within 12 weeks.
2. The defendant’s review decision of 27 February 2018 was properly understood as a decision that the claimant’s current accommodation was not suitable. It was not a decision that the accommodation was suitable temporarily. The defendant had not subsequently adopted a different position. It could not therefore rely on the principle that accommodation may be suitable for a short period while alternative accommodation is found.
3. The court preferred the approach in R v Newham LBC ex parte Begum and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in R (on the application of Aweys) v Birmingham City Council. The section 193(2) duty is expressed as a duty to secure a result, not as a duty to take reasonable steps or to secure accommodation within a reasonable time. Once the accommodation occupied is unsuitable, the authority is in breach. Reasonable delay and the authority’s efforts remain relevant to relief.
4. Suitability is elastic and depends, among other things, on the nature and condition of the accommodation, the needs of the applicant and family, and the likely duration of occupation. The passage of time alone may cause accommodation to cease to be suitable. The claimant did not need to prove a deterioration in circumstances.
5. The defendant’s evidence showed no adequate or coherent effort to secure suitable accommodation. General references to limited resources, housing shortages and higher-priority applicants were insufficient. The seriousness of the daughter’s needs, the length of the delay and the absence of evidence that suitable accommodation would become available justified mandatory relief.