Martin v Solicitors Regulation Authority

An appellate court may interfere with a disciplinary tribunal’s factual findings only where they are plainly wrong. The appellant must identify a material evidential error, or show that the conclusion cannot reasonably be explained or justified. The appellate court’s own preference for a different conclusion is insufficient.

A specialist tribunal’s decision must be read as a whole and with due allowance for its expertise. Assessing competing explanations does not reverse the burden of proof. Regulatory proceedings remain fair despite missing evidence where the regulator acted fairly and sufficient credible evidence supported the findings. Costs decisions are likewise reviewable only for an error of principle or a conclusion outside the ambit of reasonable disagreement.

A solicitor appealed under section 49(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974 against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s order striking her from the Roll and requiring her to pay approximately £47,000 towards the regulator’s costs.

The Tribunal had proved two of nine allegations to the criminal standard. It found that the solicitor procured a beneficiary’s cheque for £4,700, caused or allowed it to enter her personal account, treated the money as her own and later made misleading representations to the regulator’s forensic investigator. Dishonesty and serious professional misconduct were found.

The appeal challenged the Tribunal’s evaluation of the witnesses, treatment of good character, application of the burden of proof, use of overlapping evidence and the fairness of proceedings affected by delay and unavailable documents. It also challenged the costs order because seven allegations had failed.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Under rule 52.21(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the court’s task was to decide whether the Tribunal was wrong, rather than to rehear the case or re-evaluate the evidence. Interference with factual findings required a critical finding lacking an evidential basis, a demonstrable misunderstanding or omission of relevant evidence, or a conclusion that could not reasonably be explained or justified. A different conclusion preferred by the appellate court would not suffice.

2. The Tribunal was entitled to accept the core of the beneficiary’s evidence despite recognised problems with her reliability. Her account was supported by the contemporaneous attendance note, visitors’ book, cheque, bank records and estate ledger. The Tribunal had heard extensive oral evidence and considered the evidential difficulties. Its findings were rational and not plainly wrong.

3. The Tribunal’s judgment had to be read as a whole. It was appropriate to presume, absent a compelling reason otherwise, that the specialist Tribunal had considered the evidence and submissions recorded in its decision. Its compressed treatment of the solicitor’s good character did not establish that the matter had been overlooked, particularly because the Tribunal expressly considered her testimonials when deciding the closely connected second allegation.

4. The Tribunal did not reverse the burden of proof. It expressly placed the burden on the regulator and applied the criminal standard. Once it had considered the regulator’s evidence, it was entitled to test whether the solicitor’s competing explanations raised a reasonable doubt. The absence of a plausible explanation for the cheque’s payment into, and rapid expenditure from, her personal account was relevant evidence.

5. The use of evidence common to both allegations was legitimate. The Tribunal rationally rejected the solicitor’s changing account of what Nationwide had told her and could infer that her statements to the investigator were contrived to obscure her conduct.

6. The proceedings remained fair. The court did not determine whether a regulator owes a general duty to pursue every reasonable line of inquiry. The SRA was required to prosecute fairly and to take reasonable steps to obtain available, relevant and material evidence. Neither the unavailable paying-in slip nor the lost electronic diary rendered the hearing unfair, because other sufficient credible evidence supported the findings.

7. The Tribunal applied the correct costs principles. Its 50% reduction reflected the failure of seven allegations, while recognising that the allegations had been properly brought and that the two proved allegations required substantial work. The order disclosed no error of principle and remained within the ambit of reasonable disagreement.

1. High Court, Administrative Court: The appeal under section 49(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974 was dismissed. The striking-off and costs orders were upheld: [2020] EWHC 3525 (Admin).

2. Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: Following an 11-day hearing, the Tribunal proved two of nine allegations, found dishonesty and serious misconduct, struck the solicitor from the Roll on 19 November 2019 and ordered her to pay approximately £47,000 in costs. Its written judgment was dated 13 February 2020.