NV (Vietnam) v District Court In Plezen-Mesto, Czech Republic & Anor

For oppression under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, the court must apply a high threshold and assess the requested person’s mental condition, the risk of suicide, and the preventive arrangements available in the United Kingdom, during transfer and in the requesting state. A risk that cannot be eliminated entirely does not itself establish oppression.

Under Article 8, the question is whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with private or family life. The court must balance the individual circumstances against the public interest in giving effect to extradition arrangements, including the seriousness of the offences and the requesting state’s responsibility for medical care and suicide prevention.

This was an appeal against District Judge Griffiths’s order on 30 April 2019 for the appellant’s extradition to the Czech Republic under two European arrest warrants. One warrant concerned a people-trafficking conviction, with a right to retrial; the other concerned supplying cannabis.

The appellant relied on evidence that he had been trafficked and suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and suicidal thoughts. He argued that extradition would be oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 and disproportionate under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether the evidence met the oppression threshold and whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with his private or family life.

1. Appeal dismissed. Neither the section 25 ground nor the Article 8 ground was made out.
2. For section 25 oppression, the court applied the high threshold described in Wolkowicz v Polish Judicial Authority [2013] EWHC 102 (Admin) and Turner v Government of the USA [2012] EWHC 2426 (Admin). The court had to make an overall judgment, assess whether the mental condition was linked to a substantial risk of suicide, and consider whether the requesting state had arrangements capable of addressing the condition and preventing a successful attempt.
3. The assessment proceeded in three stages: custody in the United Kingdom, transfer to the requesting state, and detention there. The court could rely on the executive’s protective arrangements in the United Kingdom, transfer arrangements, and the ordinary presumption that a European Union requesting state would take proper measures, absent strong contrary evidence. The Czech authorities’ further information reinforced that presumption.
4. The fact that preventive measures could never guarantee that suicide would be impossible did not establish oppression. The appellant had made no suicide attempt, had not been diagnosed with psychosis, and the evidence did not show that extradition would cause a severe and permanent deterioration in his mental health. The high threshold was therefore not met.
5. Article 8 required a proportionality judgment, not a broad discretion. Applying the balance-sheet approach described in Celinski v Poland [2014] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the court weighed the appellant’s trafficking history, mental health, relationship and time already served against the seriousness of the offences, the absence of significant delay, the lack of dependants, the fugitive context and the public interest in extradition.
6. The presumptions concerning medical facilities and suicide prevention were also relevant under Article 8. The interference with the appellant’s private and family life would not be disproportionate. The extradition order therefore stood.

• District Judge Griffiths: ordered extradition on 30 April 2019 under two European arrest warrants.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Cutts J refused permission on the papers on 30 July 2019. Swift J granted permission after oral renewal on 11 December 2019. Mr Justice Nicol dismissed the appeal on 25 February 2020.