Presidential Insurance Company Ltd v Twitz and another (Trinidad and Tobago)

An agreement for sale may provide that property passes only when a specified condition, such as payment of the final instalment, is fulfilled. Until then, the seller may remain owner and retain an insurable interest. Registration under vehicle legislation does not, without more, determine ownership where the statutory definition is confined to that legislation. An appellate court will ordinarily respect concurrent findings of pure fact, intervening only in very limited circumstances. It will also decline to entertain a new coverage issue outside the agreed preliminary issue which was not pleaded, evidenced or permitted below.

The appeal arose from a road traffic accident in which Kerwin Tenia suffered fatal injuries. His mother, Emily Twitz, acting as representative of his estate, claimed damages against Dexter Ramphal, the vehicle owner, and Presidential Insurance Company Ltd. The claim against the insurer relied on section 10A(1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks) Act.

The insurer argued that Ramphal had sold the car to his aunt before the accident and therefore lacked an insurable interest. At a preliminary trial, Jones J held on 21 May 2013 that Ramphal remained owner and that a valid policy existed. The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the insurer’s appeal on 26 April 2017. The non-disclosure defence was abandoned. The central issue before the Board was whether Ramphal remained owner of the car, with a further attempted issue concerning driver coverage.

The Board dismissed the appeal. The live issue was whether Ramphal remained owner of the car at the date of the accident and therefore had an insurable interest.

1. Concurrent findings of fact. The Board applied the established practice, stated in Devi v Roy [1946] AC 508, that concurrent findings of pure fact should not be disturbed except in very limited circumstances. The evidence entitled the trial judge to find that Ramphal remained owner, and there was no basis for appellate intervention.
2. Conditional transfer of property. The evidence showed an agreement to sell the car by three instalments, with the final instalment payable when the parties attended the Licensing Authority to register the transfer. The arrangement was consistent with property passing only on payment of the final instalment. Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act gave effect to that agreement. Since the final instalment remained unpaid before the accident, Ramphal retained ownership and therefore had an insurable interest.
3. Registration. The Board refused to admit further evidence concerning registration, since there was no good reason why it had not been produced at trial. In any event, the definition of owner in section 2 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act applied only for the purposes of that Act. Registration as owner therefore did not establish ownership for the insurance issue.
4. Driver coverage argument. The Board declined to entertain the insurer’s submission under sections 4(7) and 10 of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks) Act. The issue fell outside the agreed preliminary question, had not been pleaded or explored in evidence, and had not been permitted by the Court of Appeal. The final judgment awarding the claimant an agreed sum had also not been appealed.

The appeal was dismissed.

• Privy Council: The appeal was dismissed: [2020] UKPC 20.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: The appeal against the preliminary findings was dismissed on 26 April 2017.
• High Court of Justice: Jones J held on 21 May 2013 that Ramphal remained owner of the car and that a valid and enforceable insurance policy existed.