Tony Lee Vincent Grant & Ors v R

Secondary liability for murder does not depend on proof that an accessory’s encouragement or assistance caused the principal’s act. An overwhelming supervening act direction is required only where there is a sustainable basis to find that the accessory’s conduct had become mere background, had lost all operative force, or was so distant in time, place or circumstances that it was unrealistic to regard the offence as encouraged or assisted by it.

A different weapon, method of killing, or a principal’s intention to kill rather than cause grievous bodily harm will not ordinarily require such a direction. Written directions or a route to verdict should generally be given in all but simple cases, but their omission alone does not make a verdict unsafe.

Three appellants were tried at Bradford Crown Court after a vehicle was deliberately driven into two pedestrians, killing one and attempting to kill the other. The prosecution alleged that Mohammed Khan drove the vehicle and that Tony Grant was the front-seat passenger in a planned attack. Both men were also convicted of conspiracies to destroy or obtain CCTV evidence from a petrol station. Salman Ismail was convicted of those conspiracies and of arson.

Khan and Grant challenged aspects of their convictions, including the absence of an overwhelming supervening act direction, the absence of written jury directions, the sufficiency of the attempted-murder case, and the admission of weapons and masks found in Grant’s BMW. All three challenged sentences or sought leave to do so.

1. The conviction appeals were dismissed and the renewed conviction applications were refused. Applying R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, the court held that secondary liability is not founded on causation. Once encouragement or assistance is proved, the prosecution need not prove that it had a positive effect. The relevant issue is whether the accessory’s conduct had, by the time of the offence, lost its material connection with the principal’s act.

2. There was no evidential basis for an overwhelming supervening act direction. Grant and the other occupants were arguably seeking the victims in the immediate area with an intention to cause really serious harm. Khan’s use of the vehicle was not so distant in time, place or circumstances from Grant’s encouragement that it was unrealistic to regard the killing as encouraged or assisted by Grant. A different weapon, method of attack, or a principal’s intention to kill will not ordinarily alter that conclusion where the accessory intended to assist grievous bodily harm.

3. The court strongly endorsed written directions and routes to verdict, particularly in cases involving multiple counts or significant legal directions. Criminal Procedure Rules rule 25.14(4) was permissive, but the applicable practice direction expected a written route to verdict unless it was superfluous. Nevertheless, the omission of written material alone did not render the verdicts unsafe. There had to be a material error or confusion in the oral directions, save perhaps in an exceptionally complex case. The oral directions here were sufficient.

4. It was open to the jury to find that Khan formed an intention to kill Mr Ahmed when he deliberately drove a heavy vehicle at the pedestrians. Criminal intent may be formed on the spur of the moment. The different rulings on Khan and Grant were justified because there was no evidence that Grant, as passenger, shared Khan’s particular intention to kill.

5. The masks and baseball bat recovered from Grant’s BMW were admissible. The jury could infer that they had been brought to the gathering for use in the planned assault. They were relevant to intention and formed part of the immediate background to an attack in which a face covering and a heavy object were used.

6. Sentence. Khan was refused permission to appeal his 26-year minimum term. Grant’s concurrent sentences for the conspiracies to pervert the course of justice were reduced from 17 to 14 years. Ismail’s concurrent sentences for the conspiracies and arson were reduced from 17 to 11 years, reflecting his lesser role and the fact that the arson was the implementation of the conspiracy.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The court dismissed the conviction appeals and refused the renewed conviction applications. It refused Khan permission to appeal sentence, reduced Grant’s concurrent conspiracy sentences to 14 years, and reduced Ismail’s concurrent sentences to 11 years.
• Bradford Crown Court. Grant and Khan were convicted of murder and related conspiracies. Khan was also convicted of attempted murder. Ismail was convicted of two conspiracies to pervert the course of justice and arson. Life sentences and determinate sentences were imposed as described in the judgment.