Case details
Summary
A conviction for wounding with intent under section 18 requires proof that the defendant intended to cause really serious injury. Recklessness as to injury is insufficient.
Where alternative counts under sections 18 and 20 are left to a jury, directions must identify the distinct mental elements and give a clear route to verdict. A written route to verdict should normally be provided unless it would be genuinely superfluous. It assists both the jury and the trial judge in identifying the essential ingredients and live issues.
Factual background
The appellant was convicted in the Crown Court at Northampton of assault by beating and wounding with intent. The prosecution alleged that she had driven a car into Mrs Houston after an earlier assault. The appellant denied causing the injuries.
The trial concerned alternative counts under sections 18 and 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. During deliberations, the jury asked whether an intention to frighten, coupled with an injury caused by a collision, could establish count 2. The recorder directed that awareness of a risk of injury and unreasonable risk-taking would make the appellant guilty of count 2.
The appellant appealed against the section 18 conviction on the ground that the direction misstated its mental element. The central issue was whether that misdirection rendered the conviction unsafe and, if so, whether a section 20 conviction should be substituted or a retrial ordered.
Held
Appeal allowed. The conviction for wounding with intent under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was unsafe and was quashed. A retrial was ordered on the section 18 and section 20 counts. The conviction for assault by beating remained in force.
Section 18 is an offence of specific intent. The prosecution had to prove that, when the appellant drove into Mrs Houston, she intended to cause really serious injury. Recklessness as to whether injury might result could not establish that offence.
The recorder's answer to the jury's question incorrectly stated that knowledge of a risk of injury, followed by unreasonable risk-taking, was enough for count 2. That direction supplied the mental element potentially relevant to the alternative section 20 count, not to section 18. The earlier directions also failed to explain the two possible states of mind for section 20: an intention to cause some injury, however minor, or awareness of the risk of causing such injury followed by risk-taking.
The court declined to substitute a section 20 conviction under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The prosecution allegation was serious and there was a case to answer, but no jury had properly considered the two alternative charges. The appropriate course was therefore a retrial.
The court added guidance on procedure. A certificate that a case is fit for appeal is exceptional; a compelling ground of appeal does not itself make a certificate appropriate. The ordinary appeal process should generally be used. The procedural requirements of Criminal Procedure Rule 39.4 had not been followed.
The absence of written directions or a written route to verdict materially contributed to the error. Under the Criminal Practice Direction, a written route should be supplied unless the case is so straightforward that it would be superfluous. A route tailored to the evidence and issues would have kept the distinct ingredients of the alternative offences clear.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the section 18 conviction, and ordered a retrial on the section 18 and section 20 counts: [2018] EWCA Crim 320.
- Crown Court at Northampton: On 3 January 2018, convicted the appellant of assault by beating and wounding with intent. The section 18 conviction was later quashed; the assault conviction stood.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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