Uddin & Anor v R.

A defective or insufficiently structured summing-up does not make a conviction unsafe if, read as a whole, it fairly places the essence of the defence before the jury and the omissions have no material individual or cumulative effect. Separate counts require separate consideration; acquittal on one count does not determine another. Prosecutors may limit investigations for strategic and resource reasons, provided the resulting trial is fair. A prosecution is not an abuse merely because the evidence later relied upon differs from that available at charge, absent bad faith. Evidence may be excluded where it is peripheral or non-probative. A firm or sceptical summing-up remains fair if balanced overall.

Following a lengthy multi-defendant trial at the Crown Court at Southwark, Tamij Uddin was convicted of conspiracy to defraud. Kazi Borkot Ullah and Abdul Kalam Muhammad Rezaul Karim were convicted of further conspiracy and related offences. Mr Uddin appealed with permission, arguing that the judge had failed to sum up his case adequately. Mr Ullah and Mr Karim renewed applications for permission to appeal, relying principally on alleged prosecutorial failures, evidential rulings, abuse of process, and unfairness in the summing-up. The central issues were whether the convictions were unsafe or the proceedings abusive.

The appeal and the two renewed applications were dismissed.

1. Mr Uddin’s appeal. The judge’s summary of the defence was too short and did not provide the fully structured marshalling or analysis contemplated by the CrimPD. That defect was particularly important because Mr Uddin had not given evidence. Nevertheless, the essence of his case—that he was an innocent intermediary whose name had been used by others—was clearly before the jury. Reading the summing-up as a whole, none of the alleged omissions, individually or cumulatively, rendered the conviction unsafe.
2. The judge was not required to give elaborate legal analysis of the text messages. Although they fell outside the period of the individual applications, they fell within the alleged conspiracy period and their relevance to whether Mr Uddin knowingly participated was obvious. The jury was entitled to assess that issue. Separate counts also required separate consideration; acquittal on Count 3 did not entail acquittal on Count 1.
3. Mr Ullah’s application. Prosecuting authorities may limit investigations because resources are finite and for legitimate strategic or case-management reasons. Failure to interview every applicant did not itself make the trial unfair, particularly where extensive investigations and disclosure had occurred. The use of the threshold test at charging did not make the prosecution abusive. There was no general obligation to continue relying on the evidence available at charge, and there was sufficient evidence at later stages. A speculative allegation of breach of legal professional privilege, unsupported by evidence, could not establish abuse.
4. Mr Karim’s application. Immigration tribunal decisions concerning allegedly fraudulent applications were inadmissible; the jury had to decide the case on the evidence before it at the criminal trial. The judge was entitled to exclude peripheral material concerning BJGP and a small, non-comparable transfer to Bangladesh. A robust summary of damaging evidence was permissible where the judge explained the jury’s functions and fairly presented the defence. The indication that uncharged applicants might require warnings against self-incrimination did not render the trial unfair.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In [2021] EWCA Crim 14, Mr Uddin’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. The renewed applications by Mr Ullah and Mr Karim were also dismissed.
2. Crown Court at Southwark. Following the trial, Mr Uddin was convicted on Count 1; Mr Ullah was convicted on Counts 1, 2 and 3; and Mr Karim was convicted on Counts 1, 2 and 3.