R v Christopher Gordon

A conviction is not rendered unsafe merely because a serving police officer sat on the jury without the trial judge having been told of that occupation. The decisive question is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In assessing a police officer juror, the relevant considerations include disputed police evidence, professional connections with police witnesses, and service in the same unit or a shared local background.

Improper post-trial contact by a juror, including a willingness to disclose deliberations, does not itself demonstrate that the juror approached the trial with bias. There must be a credible basis for concluding that the juror failed to discharge the oath or that the tribunal was, or appeared to be, biased.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Aylesbury of two counts of rape of a girl under 13 and four counts of causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity.

After the trial, a serving Metropolitan Police officer who had sat on the jury contacted the officer in the case. He sought a meeting and indicated that he wished to discuss the case and what had occurred in the jury room. The applicant sought leave to appeal, contending that the juror had deliberately failed to disclose his occupation and that the contact disclosed apparent bias.

The Court of Appeal granted an extension of time and admitted fresh evidence. It considered whether the undisclosed presence of the police officer, and his subsequent conduct, rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Extension and fresh evidence. The court granted the 21-day extension of time and, pursuant to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, admitted the unopposed fresh evidence concerning the juror’s post-trial contact.
2. No unsafe conviction from non-disclosure. The application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. Criminal Practice Direction 2015, Division VI, paragraphs 26C.6 and 26C.7, requires the judge to be informed of serving police officers at jury selection and to assess whether they may serve. The governing question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased, applying the formulation in Porter v McGill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] AC 357.
3. None of the relevant reasons for excluding the juror was present. There was no connection with the investigation or the officers involved, no shared relevant police-unit background, and no disputed police evidence. The applicant’s earlier conviction, and his general suspicion of the police, could not provide a credible basis for exclusion. Any application to exclude the juror would therefore inevitably have failed.
4. No deliberate concealment. The evidence showed that the juror had repeatedly identified himself as a police officer when responding to the jury summons and on his expenses form. The court rejected as untenable the suggestion that he had deliberately withheld his occupation from the court.
5. Post-trial conduct. The juror’s proposed personal meeting with the officer in the case was ill-advised. His apparent willingness to disclose jury deliberations was potentially inconsistent with section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. However, no deliberations were disclosed, and the conduct occurred after the trial. It was a separate matter from whether he had acted as a juror with bias. It did not provide a real possibility, viewed objectively, that the tribunal had been biased.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2021] EWCA Crim 1684, the court granted an extension of time and admitted fresh evidence, but refused leave to appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Aylesbury: On 18 November 2020, the applicant was convicted by a judge and jury of two counts of rape of a girl under 13 and four counts of causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity.