Field v Regina (Rev1)

A victim’s act will break the chain of causation only if it is a free, voluntary and informed decision. A significant deception by an accused may prevent that conclusion where it changes the true nature or reality of the activity and materially increases its danger. This can include an undisclosed intention to cause death by a person who falsely presents as caring and protective.

Accordingly, a jury may find that an accused who intentionally supplies alcohol or drugs has caused death if that act was more than a minimal cause and the victim’s apparent agreement was not an informed exercise of autonomy.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud and burglary offences and was convicted of the murder of Peter Farquhar at the Crown Court at Oxford before Sweeney J. The prosecution alleged that, intending to kill, he was present and gave the deceased alcohol and/or Dalmane, and/or smothered him. The appellant admitted deception and exploitation but denied murder, contending that the deceased voluntarily consumed the whisky.

On appeal, he challenged the judge’s directions on causation and voluntariness. He also sought leave to appeal his life sentence after it emerged that the judge had omitted credit for time spent on remand. The central issue was whether the deceased’s drinking could break the chain of causation despite the appellant’s alleged undisclosed homicidal purpose.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The judge’s directions correctly required the jury to be sure that the appellant intended to kill and, with that intent, personally committed one or more alleged acts which were more than a minimal cause of death.

2. The court applied the autonomy principle in R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269. An informed adult of sound mind ordinarily makes an autonomous choice, so a freely and voluntarily self-administered substance will not ordinarily make its supplier the cause of death. The issue is fact-sensitive and requires close analysis of whether the victim was able to make an informed decision.

3. Here, the appellant’s alleged hidden intention to kill, combined with his false presentation as the deceased’s loving and protective partner, could materially alter the nature and danger of the deceased’s undertaking. If the appellant was present and deliberately encouraged the deceased to consume strong whisky while knowing of the risk arising from its interaction with Dalmane, the deceased could have been lured into danger without an informed appreciation of it. His apparent agreement to drink would not necessarily be free, voluntary and informed, and would not necessarily break causation.

4. The directions properly left those factual matters to the jury. They made clear that merely leaving a bottle as a temptation was not the prosecution case and was insufficient for murder. The jury had to be sure that the appellant’s intentional conduct in supplying drink, drugs or by smothering was a more than minimal cause of death.

5. The court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal sentence. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, credit had to be given for 346 days spent on remand. The life sentence and 36-year minimum term remained, subject to deduction of those 346 days.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the conviction appeal and, in [2021] EWCA Crim 380, granted leave to appeal sentence out of time solely to correct the omitted remand credit.

• Crown Court at Oxford (Sweeney J): the appellant pleaded guilty to fraud and burglary offences on 21 March 2019, was convicted of murder on 9 August 2019, and was sentenced on 18 October 2019 to life imprisonment with a 36-year minimum term.