Hook, R. v

An alleged factual mistake by a sentencing judge does not automatically justify appellate intervention. The applicant must show that the mistake materially contaminated the sentencing process, producing a sentence that was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. When sentencing participants in a common conspiracy, a judge may calibrate sentences by reference to an overall hierarchy of roles, provided that no defendant receives more than would have been appropriate if sentenced alone. An extension of time will be refused where the proposed appeal has no arguable merit and significant further delay lacks proper explanation.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Southwark of conspiracy to supply a controlled class A drug, contrary to s.1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. He was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment in November 2015. His application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused by the full court in February 2017.

He subsequently sought an extension of more than four years to apply for leave to appeal against sentence. He alleged that the sentencing judge had mistakenly understood that two co-conspirators had received starting points of 18 years before credit for guilty pleas, when their actual starting points had been about 16 years. The central issues were whether that alleged mistake justified appellate interference and whether the delay should be excused.

The applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against sentence were refused.

1. The court emphasised the limited advantage of an appellate court when reviewing sentencing decisions, particularly where the sentencing judge had presided over a lengthy trial and had provided detailed sentencing remarks. This reflected the approach in R v Williams (Declan Cragg) [2019] EWCA Crim 279.
2. The court was not satisfied that the judge had proceeded on a firm mistaken apprehension about the precise starting points used for the co-conspirators. In any event, even assuming the alleged mistake, it did not automatically make the sentence manifestly excessive. The applicant had to demonstrate that the mistake contaminated the sentencing process in a way that produced a manifestly excessive or wrong-in-principle sentence.
3. The judge was entitled to sentence the defendants within an overall scheme reflecting their respective roles. The co-conspirators were enhanced couriers, whereas the applicant was at the heart of the organisation and in overall control. A 22-year sentence was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle merely because the lower rung of the scheme involved starting points of about 16 years before credit for guilty pleas. The judge had expressly stated that no defendant received more than would have been imposed if sentenced in isolation.
4. There was no arguable merit in the proposed sentence appeal. Although the applicant said he discovered the alleged error in late 2018, there was no proper explanation for the further delay until 2020. The necessary extension of time was therefore refused, as was leave to appeal sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — the applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence were refused: [2021] EWCA Crim 422.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused by the full court in February 2017.
• Crown Court at Southwark — the applicant was convicted following trial in November 2015 and sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment.