Z v Y (Revocation of Adoption Order)

Revocation of a lawfully made adoption order is available under the inherent jurisdiction only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances. Exceptional circumstances alone do not require revocation. The court must consider alleged fraud, procedural failure or breach of natural justice together with the consequences for the child, including restoration of the status quo ante. Fraud does not automatically require an order to be set aside. Where adopters oppose post-adoption contact, an order will be made only in an extremely unusual case.

Z, the biological father of X, applied under the inherent jurisdiction to revoke an adoption order made in 2017. He alleged that Y, X’s birth mother, had deceived him and the local authority about his identity and circumstances, and that the adoption process involved procedural irregularities and a breach of natural justice.

Alternatively, Z sought leave under section 51A of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to apply for contact. The local authority, the adopters and the Children’s Guardian opposed both applications.

1. The application to revoke the adoption order was refused. A lawfully and properly made adoption order may be set aside under the inherent jurisdiction only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances. Exceptional circumstances alone do not justify revocation.
2. The Fraud Act 2006 did not apply because section 5 concerned gain or loss in money or other property. Fraud did not require the order to be set aside as of right. The court retained a discretion.
3. The local authority and court had acted in good faith on the information available and had taken the steps reasonably available to identify and notify the birth father.
4. Revocation would restore the status quo ante and reinstate Y’s parental responsibility. It would also risk undermining X’s settled legal identity, placement and family relationships, with likely adverse welfare consequences.
5. Leave under section 51A was refused. The court considered the risk of disruption and harm, Z’s connection with X and the adopters’ representations. The adopters supported indirect contact but opposed imposed direct contact. In the circumstances, direct contact should not be considered before appropriate life-story work. An order opposed by adopters would arise only in an extremely unusual case.

The court considered that support for Z and guidance concerning indirect contact would nevertheless be beneficial.