PK v Mr And Mrs K

Revocation of a properly made adoption order is permissible only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances, because adoption is ordinarily final and for life. The court must nevertheless balance the public-policy importance of finality against the child’s welfare and the practical consequences of maintaining the order. Where the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional, revocation may be ordered under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. An application by a child to change their name is determined by the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. The court must weigh all relevant factors on the individual facts.

The applicant, aged 14, had been adopted by the respondents when she was almost four. About two years later she was sent to Ghana to live with members of the respondents’ extended family, where she reported significant abuse. She later returned to England and was reunited with her biological mother and maternal grandmother.

The respondents did not oppose the applications and ceased to engage with the proceedings. The applicant sought revocation of the adoption order under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and permission to change her surname to that of her biological mother. The central issues were whether the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to justify revocation and whether the proposed name change served the applicant’s welfare.

1. Adoption order revoked. The court held that the inherent jurisdiction could be exercised in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances. Public policy ordinarily required a properly made adoption order to remain final and for life, but that consideration was not absolute.
2. The applicant’s childhood had been profoundly disrupted. She had been removed from the adopters’ care, sent to Ghana, and abused there. She had returned to England, was settled with and supported by her biological family, and was competent to give instructions. Her strong wishes and feelings about her legal status were important welfare considerations.
3. Maintaining the adoption would leave the respondents as the applicant’s legal parents, with parental responsibility and decision-making rights, despite their absence from her life and her wish to have no relationship with them. It would also have emotionally harmful consequences. The sole significant factor against revocation was the public policy of upholding valid adoption orders.
4. The circumstances fell well within the exceptional category identified in Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239, Re Webster v Norfolk County Council and the Children (by their children’s guardian) [2009] EWCA Civ 59, and Re W (Inherent Jurisdiction: Permission Application: Revocation and Adoption Order) [2013] 2 FLR 1609.
5. For the name-change application, the child’s welfare was paramount. The court applied the welfare-based approach in Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] 1 FLR 1167, Re W, Re A, Re B [1999] 2 FLR 930, and Re W (Change of Name) [2013] EWCA Civ 1488. Both applications were therefore granted.