X and Y (Revocation of Adoption Orders), Re

The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to revoke a lawfully made adoption order solely because the adoption has broken down or revocation would promote the child’s welfare. The Adoption and Children Act 2002 is a comprehensive statutory scheme. It deliberately provides only a narrow statutory ground for revocation and establishes adoption as a lifelong legal status. The inherent jurisdiction cannot add a remedy which would cut across that scheme. A power remains to set aside an order for fundamental procedural injustice, consistently with binding Court of Appeal authority. Section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 does not create an unfettered power to revoke adoption orders. Although revocation would have served Y’s best interests, the court had no jurisdiction to grant it. The children’s surname-change application was granted.

AM, the adoptive mother of X and Y, aged 17 and 16, applied to revoke their adoption orders. The children had left AM’s care and were living, or had recently lived, with birth family members. Y consistently supported revocation and wished to adopt her birth mother’s surname. X’s position had fluctuated and, by the hearing, was less clear.

The application raised whether the High Court had power to revoke adoption orders made under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 on welfare grounds. AM alternatively relied on section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The court also considered whether the children should change their surnames.

1. Revocation refused. The court had no power to revoke either adoption order on welfare grounds.
2. The Adoption and Children Act 2002 creates a comprehensive statutory scheme under which adoption establishes a permanent legal status and extinguishes the parental responsibility of the birth parents. Section 55 provides only one narrow statutory ground for revocation, namely subsequent legitimation. That legislative choice was consistent with the fundamental permanence of adoption.
3. Binding Court of Appeal authority, particularly Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) and Webster v Norfolk County Council, established a limited jurisdiction to set aside an adoption order in highly exceptional circumstances involving fundamental procedural injustice or a substantial miscarriage of justice. The present application was different. It challenged the consequences of a subsequent breakdown in the adoption and relied solely on welfare.
4. The inherent jurisdiction is a safety net, not a springboard. Where Parliament has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme covering the relevant ground, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to add a remedy which cuts across or is incompatible with that scheme. The reasoning in FS v AM was applicable by analogy and led to the conclusion that the wider welfare-based jurisdiction accepted in some first-instance decisions, including AX and BX v SX and others, could not be followed.
5. Section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was not intended to permit revocation of adoption orders. A broad, unregulated power under that provision would be contrary to the statutory scheme and the public policy requiring finality in adoption.
6. The judge accepted that revocation would probably have been in Y’s best interests, although X’s position was less clear. That consideration could not create jurisdiction where none existed.
7. The applications to change both children’s surnames to BM’s surname were granted. In particular, the change was strongly in Y’s welfare interests because of her persistent distress about her legal and family identity.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.