X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside), Re

A validly made adoption order cannot be revoked under the High Court’s inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction. Adoption is statutory. Its definitive and lifelong effect cannot be displaced on welfare, identity or human rights grounds outside the statutory scheme.

The court may extend time to appeal an adoption order where there is an appealable error. That procedural power does not create a first-instance jurisdiction to revoke a valid order. Under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, parenthood can otherwise be displaced only through a further adoption or the narrow legitimation exception. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 regulates the exercise of existing judicial powers; it does not confer a new power.

AM adopted X and Y in 2013. The placement later broke down. Both young people returned to members of their natural family, and Y found the legal identity created by the adoption deeply distressing. Supported by X, Y and their natural mother, AM applied to revoke the valid adoption orders under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Lieven J refused the application in [2024] EWHC 1059 (Fam), although she considered revocation would have served Y’s best interests if the power existed. The Court of Appeal dismissed AM’s appeal in [2025] EWCA Civ 2.

By the Supreme Court hearing, X and Y were adults and no parens patriae order could benefit them. The court nevertheless determined the issue in the public interest. The central question was whether a court may set aside a validly made adoption order, otherwise than on appeal, through its inherent jurisdiction.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Stephens and Lady Simler delivered the joint judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lord Sales and Lord Doherty agreed. The High Court has no inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction to revoke a validly made adoption order.

2. The prerogative jurisdiction historically protected children who could not protect themselves. It did not extinguish or transfer parental status. Before statutory adoption was introduced, no judicial power could sever the legal relationship between a natural parent and child. There was therefore no residual power of the kind asserted.

3. In any event, the comprehensive scheme of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 occupies the field. Sections 46 and 67 give adoption a transformative, definitive and lifelong effect. The adopter becomes the legal parent, while the natural parent’s parental responsibility is extinguished. Apart from a further adoption under section 46(5), the only statutory revocation mechanism is the narrow legitimation exception in section 55. An inherent power based on later welfare or identity needs would circumvent that scheme and Parliament’s deliberate choice.

4. The residual parens patriae jurisdiction protects a child from significant harm where no statutory mechanism is adequate. It does not protect a child from the consequences of Parliament’s adoption scheme. The Children Act 1989 supplies ample protective measures after an adoption breakdown, including care, special guardianship, regulation of contact and permission to change a surname. Re-adoption also remains possible while the person is a child.

5. In re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239 correctly established that there is no inherent jurisdiction to set aside a valid adoption order. Later first-instance decisions recognising such a power misunderstood appellate authorities concerning extensions of time to appeal. A valid adoption order remains appealable for an appealable error, and time may exceptionally be extended. That is an appellate procedural jurisdiction, not a first-instance power of revocation.

6. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 operates only within powers the court already possesses. It cannot create jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires revocation to be available. The adopted identity is the identity recognised by law and protected from unlawful interference.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed AM’s appeal and affirmed that no inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction exists to revoke a validly made adoption order: [2026] UKSC 13.
2. Court of Appeal: Dismissed the appeal and held that a first-instance court had no jurisdiction to set aside a validly made adoption order, whether under the inherent jurisdiction or otherwise: [2025] EWCA Civ 2; [2025] Fam 237.
3. High Court: Lieven J refused AM’s application because a valid adoption order could not be revoked solely on welfare grounds, although the judge considered revocation would have served Y’s best interests if the power existed: [2024] EWHC 1059 (Fam); [2024] 1 WLR 5167.