AX v BX & Ors (Revocation of Adoption Order) (Rev 1)

The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to revoke a lawfully made adoption order, but the discretion is severely restricted. It may be exercised only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances. There is no exhaustive category of qualifying cases. Welfare may be relevant, although it must be balanced against the powerful public-policy reasons supporting the permanence of adoption. The court may consider welfare notwithstanding that the applicant has reached adulthood. Where adoption has irretrievably broken down, the child has returned to the natural family, all parties support revocation, and the legal status created by adoption conflicts with the established factual and legal reality, those factors may collectively justify revocation.

A and B applied under the inherent jurisdiction to revoke adoption orders made in 2011 in favour of SX and JX. The statutory ground in section 55 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 did not apply.

The adoptive placement had irretrievably broken down. Since 2018, A and B had lived within their natural family, and child arrangements orders made in 2019 had restored parental responsibility to their natural mother. All parties supported revocation, but disputed the applicable legal framework, the relevance of welfare, and whether the court could act in relation to A after she reached 18.

1. Jurisdiction and threshold. The court had inherent jurisdiction to revoke a lawfully made adoption order. Adoption is intended to be permanent and lifelong, and strong public-policy considerations require a very high threshold. The discretion could be exercised only in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances, following Webster v Norfolk County Council [2009] EWCA Civ 59.
2. There was no exhaustive category of qualifying cases. The circumstances had to comprise more than mistake, misrepresentation or serious injustice, and could include a fundamental breach of natural justice. The authorities supplied examples rather than a complete code.
3. Welfare. Welfare could be taken into account under the inherent jurisdiction where the exceptional circumstances justified it. Section 1(7) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was consistent with that approach. Welfare did not automatically determine the outcome and had to be balanced against the public-policy considerations supporting adoption’s permanence.
4. Age and identity. The court could consider welfare even though A had reached 18. A contrary approach could produce the perverse result that B’s order was revoked but A’s was not. The inherent jurisdiction was sufficiently flexible to address both applications. Article 8 rights, including identity, were engaged.
5. Application. The adoption placement had completely and irretrievably broken down. A and B had returned to and identified with their natural family; the natural mother’s parental responsibility had been restored through child arrangements orders; the adoptive parents did not seek to retain parental responsibility or legal status; and all parties supported revocation. The continuing adoption orders created a legal fiction inconsistent with the factual and legal reality and were likely to cause continuing psychological and emotional harm.
6. The public-policy considerations remained important, but the overall balance fell firmly in favour of revocation. Both adoption orders were revoked. The effect was to restore the legal relationships existing before adoption.