K v Maya

In an intercountry adoption application, consent to an overseas adoption does not automatically amount to consent to an English adoption order. The court must assess whether the parent understood the nature and effect of the proposed English order, applying a fact-sensitive and purposive approach.

Procedural or regulatory non-compliance does not necessarily invalidate an adoption application. The court should consider the purpose of the requirement, whether the placement and child have been properly safeguarded, and whether any party or the court has suffered prejudice. The child’s welfare remains the paramount consideration, assessed throughout life rather than only during childhood.

K applied for an adoption order in respect of Maya, an 11-year-old child whom she had adopted in Country F and brought to the United Kingdom. The overseas adoption was not recognised automatically in English law. The application therefore proceeded under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the Adoptions with a Foreign Element Regulations 2005.

The issues included whether the birth parents were parties and should be served, whether their consent was valid or should be dispensed with, whether the statutory and regulatory preliminaries had been satisfied, and whether adoption was required by Maya’s welfare. The birth father could not be found. The birth mother was contacted shortly before the hearing and expressed informed agreement to the proposed adoption.

1. Consent and service. The fact that an overseas adoption extinguished the birth parents’ status under foreign law did not remove them from the category of parent for the purposes of FPR 2010 r.14.3. The court nevertheless had power to dispense with service. The birth father could not be found, so his consent was dispensed with under section 52(1)(a) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and service on him was also dispensed with.
2. The birth mother’s consent to the Country F adoption was evidentially significant but was not, by itself, consent to an English adoption order. However, the signed consent, the circumstances of the overseas proceedings, her understanding that K was an English adopter, and her subsequent conversation with the Guardian demonstrated that she understood the effect of an English adoption order and consented unconditionally. Her consent was therefore valid under section 52(5). Since she had consented, there was no need to serve her with notice.
3. Statutory and regulatory compliance. K had complied with the requirements imposed on her by regulations 3 and 4 of the AFER 2005 and sections 83(4) and (5) of the ACA 2002. Any local-authority failures under regulation 5 were procedural and minimal. Applying a purposive interpretation, the court held that the relevant conditions had been substantially met because the placement had been scrutinised and monitored, the necessary information was available, and no party or the court had been prejudiced.
4. Maya had lived with K for just over seven months. That satisfied the six-month period under section 42 and regulation 9 because the section 83 requirements had been met. Alternatively, the court would have granted retrospective permission under section 42(6) if a 12-month period had applied.
5. Welfare. The court considered Maya’s wishes and feelings, her need for permanence and security, the lifelong consequences of adoption, her identity and cultural heritage, and her complex emotional and therapeutic needs. Adoption would provide a stable and reparative family life and was the only order that met her needs throughout childhood and life. An adoption order was made.