Dharmaraj v London Borough of Hounslow

Notification of a homelessness review decision to solicitors authorised, or reasonably presumed to be authorised, to receive it is notification to the applicant. A decision letter complies with the statutory duty to state the appeal period when it conveys the correct information in substance; the precise statutory wording is unnecessary.

The purpose of the notification requirements is to inform applicants of their appeal rights and preserve time until proper notification. A defect does not nullify the review decision or prevent an informed applicant from appealing against it. When reviewing intentional homelessness, an authority must consider facts raising an arguable issue that continued occupation was unreasonable, even if the applicant does not formulate the legal point expressly.

The appellant was evicted from an assured shorthold tenancy after his landlord obtained a possession order for alleged rent arrears. The respondent authority decided under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 that he had become intentionally homeless. A reviewing officer confirmed that decision and sent the decision letter by fax to the solicitors who had requested the review for him.

HHJ Mitchell dismissed the appellant's statutory appeal in the Central London County Court. The further appeal raised two questions: whether notification to the solicitors was effective and whether the letter's description of the 21-day appeal period satisfied sections 203 and 204; and whether the reviewing officer had failed to consider whether continued occupation of the premises would have been reasonable.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Notification of the review decision to the appellant's solicitors was valid notification to him. A person may ordinarily appoint an agent to act on his behalf, and the Housing Act 1996 contained no requirement for personal service. The solicitors had requested the review, and the appellant had separately authorised the authority to correspond with them. Either circumstance entitled a reasonable authority to presume that they could receive the decision on his behalf.
2. The decision letter correctly conveyed the appeal period because it was faxed to the solicitors on the date of the letter. Twenty-one days from the letter's date was therefore the same period as 21 days from notification. Section 203(5) imposed a substantive informational requirement, not a requirement to reproduce the precise words of section 204(2).
3. Alternatively, a minor departure having the same practical effect would not invalidate the notice. Applying the modern approach to statutory procedural requirements associated with R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, the court must examine the requirement's legislative purpose and decide whether that purpose requires every departure to render the document a nullity.
4. Sections 203(5) and (6) were intended to ensure knowledge of the right and period of appeal and to preserve time until the applicant had been properly informed. They did not make the review decision null or prevent an applicant who knew of it from appealing under section 204(1). The county court therefore had jurisdiction over the appeal against the review decision.
5. A reviewing officer must consider facts which raise an arguable case that accommodation was not reasonable for the applicant to continue occupying. This remains so where a homeless applicant is unaware of the statutory structure and fails to express the legal issue explicitly. Here, however, the represented appellant relied on the property's condition to explain the landlord's motive for eviction, not to contend that the premises were unfit for continued occupation. His complaints did not raise a real issue of fitness, and the reviewing officer had addressed the matters that properly required consideration.
6. Lord Neuberger MR added, obiter, that a notice received a few days after its date, and thus misstating the available period by a few days, could substantially comply with section 203(5). A notice omitting any information about the right or time to appeal might fall short of section 203(6), but the consequence would be that notification had not been given, not that the decision itself was null or ineffective.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court dismissed the further appeal and upheld the county court's dismissal of the statutory appeal.
• Central London County Court: HHJ Mitchell rejected both challenges to the homelessness review decision and dismissed the appeal.
• Local authority review: The reviewing officer confirmed the original decision that the appellant had become intentionally homeless under the Housing Act 1996.