ZR v London Borough of Haringey & Anor

The statutory move-on period for a newly recognised refugee is governed by the interaction between the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the Asylum Support Regulations 2000. Where asylum support accommodation is occupied, the notice period is at least the later of the prescribed determination period and seven days from service of the notice to quit.

A local housing authority’s discretion to provide accommodation pending a homelessness review involves balancing the merits of the challenge, new material and the applicant’s circumstances against fairness between applicants and scarce resources. Judicial review intervention is exceptional. A public-law challenge will not ordinarily proceed where it is academic, fact-sensitive and the claimant has suffered no material prejudice.

The claimant, a recognised refugee from Sudan, challenged the London Borough of Haringey’s decision that he was not in priority need under the Housing Act 1996 and its refusal to accommodate him pending review. He also challenged the Secretary of State’s August and September 2023 practices for calculating the period before asylum support accommodation ended.

Interim accommodation had initially been ordered by Lang J, but the claimant’s homelessness decision had in fact been made before proceedings were issued. The issues were whether the local authority’s decision and notification were unlawful, whether the Home Office practices were unlawful or caused actionable prejudice, and whether urgent or academic judicial review proceedings should continue.

1. First defendant. The section 184 decision had been validly communicated by email. The Homelessness Code of Guidance 2023 contemplated notification by email, and the circumstances showed that the claimant could engage with electronic communications. The authority was not required to ensure that he subjectively understood the decision’s contents. There was some force in the criticism that the claimant’s solicitors should have been told that a decision had been made, but that omission was outweighed by the representatives’ failure to make any inquiry before seeking urgent relief.
2. The decision that the claimant was not in priority need was not arguably irrational. It was made after an urgent assessment, taking account of the psychologist’s report and the claimant’s answers. The discretion under section 188(3) to provide accommodation pending review involved the balancing exercise identified in R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed and R v Brighton & Hove Council ex p Nacion. The court should interfere only in an exceptional case. There was no realistic prospect of success.
3. Once the section 202 review decision had been made, jurisdiction concerning interim accommodation lay in the County Court under section 204A. The High Court therefore refused permission against the first defendant, set aside Lang J’s without-notice interim order, and ordered the claimant to pay the first defendant’s costs. The claim that accommodation had been obtained through the proceedings did not justify a different costs order because the application had proceeded on a materially false premise.
4. Second defendant. Both the August and September practices fell within the statutory scheme. The September practice, which calculated the 28-day period from issue of the biometric residence permit, was more favourable than the statutory timetable and had not caused the claimant material prejudice. The evidence of other cases showed failures in issuing documents or responding to homelessness applications, rather than prejudice caused by the September practice itself.
5. The challenge to the September practice was therefore academic and lacked a claimant with sufficient interest. Applying R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Salem and R (Zoolife International Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the court refused permission. The application for interim relief consequently fell away.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Lang J granted interim accommodation on 20 December 2023. The present court set that order aside, refused permission against both defendants and left any subsisting Article 3 damages claim to be addressed separately, potentially after County Court proceedings.