Director of Public Prosecutions v Jurijs Briedis & Anor

A property freezing order may be made at the investigative stage where the statutory conditions are satisfied, including a good arguable case that the property is recoverable property. Cryptoassets fall within the wide statutory concept of property. A criminal restraint order should be discharged where criminal proceedings have not started within a reasonable time, particularly after the investigation has moved to civil recovery. Continuing restraint may also prevent property from being recoverable for Part 5 purposes. The presumptive starting point for such proceedings is a public hearing. Privacy or anonymity requires a principled and proportionate justification.

The DPP applied under section 245A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for a property freezing order over cash, watches, cryptoassets, a vehicle and bank-account funds. The CPS also applied under section 42(3)(a) for discharge of restraint orders made by the Crown Court under section 41 in August 2019.

The criminal investigation had concluded and the matter had been adopted for civil recovery. The respondents had adequate notice and did not oppose either application. The court had to determine whether the restraint orders should be discharged, whether the statutory conditions for a property freezing order were met, and whether the hearing should be private or anonymised.

1. Open justice. The court rejected private hearing and anonymity. The presumptive starting point was that the proceedings should take place in public. The interim nature of the order, the relatively low statutory threshold and the engagement of Article 8 rights did not justify privacy or anonymity on the facts. Anonymity could, where justified, be a more effective and proportionate measure than a private hearing.
2. Property freezing order. Section 245A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 permitted the DPP, as an enforcement authority, to apply before civil recovery proceedings had begun. The property was properly specified and described, and the order contained appropriate restrictions and provision for legal expenses and applications for variation or discharge. The court was satisfied that there was a good arguable case that the property was recoverable property. The alternative associated-property issue was not engaged.
3. Cryptoassets. Cryptoassets fell within the wide definition of property in section 316(4)(c), namely other intangible property. The statutory purpose supported that construction. The court was assisted by AA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm); [2020] 4 WLR 35, in which Bitcoin had been treated as property at common law.
4. Restraint orders. Exercising the jurisdiction of the Crown Court under section 8 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court discharged the section 41 orders. Discharge was appropriate under section 42(5)(a), and was also required because criminal proceedings had not started within a reasonable time under section 42(7)(a). Discharge was a precondition to the property freezing order because of section 308(8).
5. Orders. The property freezing order was made. The DPP was directed, by 20 May 2022, either to start a claim for a civil recovery order or apply for continuation of the property freezing order. Costs were reserved.

• Crown Court: made restraint orders under section 41 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 on 1 August 2019.
• High Court (Administrative Court): exercising the Crown Court’s jurisdiction under section 8 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, discharged the restraint orders and made the property freezing order.