Director of Public Prosecutions v Joseph James O’Connor & Ors

Under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, cryptocurrency is property capable of being recoverable. The court must make a recovery order where it is satisfied, on the civil standard, that the property was obtained through unlawful conduct and no statutory exception applies.

That conclusion may be reached by drawing an irresistible inference from the totality of the evidence. Relevant matters include the use of nominee account-holders, crypto-mixing services, anonymous exchanges, unexplained wealth, links to admitted offending, and the absence of a credible lawful explanation. Property situated outside the United Kingdom may be recovered where the statutory connection with England and Wales is established.

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought a civil recovery order under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in respect of cryptocurrency held in accounts registered to the second and third defendants. The claimant alleged that the property represented proceeds of unlawful conduct connected with the first defendant’s admitted hacking, fraud and money-laundering offences in the United States.

The second and third defendants did not contest the claim and did not attend the hearings. The first defendant, after late participation, disclaimed any interest in the property but raised issues concerning service and the possible use of recovered funds to satisfy a United States restitution order. The central issues were whether the property was recoverable, whether the court could proceed in the absence of defendants, and whether the property’s location and the defendants’ links to England and Wales satisfied the statutory requirements.

1. The claim succeeded. The court made a civil recovery order under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 266, appointed a trustee for civil recovery, vested the property in the trustee, and made no order for costs.
2. Under s 266(1), the court must make a recovery order if satisfied that property is recoverable and no statutory exception applies. Cryptocurrency falls within “property” under s 316(4), including intangible property. The court relied on Director of Public Prosecutions v Briedis [2021] EWHC 3155 (Admin).
3. The property was recoverable under s 304 because, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence established that it had been obtained through unlawful conduct. The court could draw an irresistible inference of criminal origin without identifying one specific offence. It adopted the fairly liberal approach to proof described in R (Serious Organised Crime Agency) v Wang [2011] EWHC 4100 (Admin) and considered the guidance in Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Olupitan [2007] EWHC 162 (QB), SOCA v Gale [2009] EWHC 1015 (QB), SOCA v Namli [2013] EWHC 1200 (QB) and Claimant v Surin [2025] EWHC 10 (KB).
4. The inference arose from the use of proxy account-holders, crypto-mixers, anonymous exchanges and further proxies, the first defendant’s admitted United States offending involving cryptocurrency, the absence of lawful income capable of explaining the assets, and the absence of a credible explanation. The foreign conduct would have been unlawful in England and Wales and therefore fell within s 241(2).
5. The court could make an order concerning property wherever situated under s 282A. If the property was outside the United Kingdom, the statutory connection requirement was met because the defendants were British citizens and the second and third defendants were resident or present in England and Wales. The relevant connection was established through para 5 of Schedule 7A.
6. The court proceeded in the absence of the second and third defendants because they had been properly served, knew of the hearings, and had chosen not to attend. It adopted the approach in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA v Catanzaro [2023] EWHC 3309 (Comm). Retrospective alternative service on the first defendant’s brother was approved under CPR 6.27 because repeated steps had brought the documents to the first defendant’s attention.
7. The property freezing order was discharged seven days after vesting in the trustee. The order was to be served on the defendants and the Home Office.

This was a first-instance civil recovery claim. A case management conference took place before Master Dagnall on 18 March 2025, followed by hearings before Mrs Justice Hill on 9 June and 11 November 2025. The court proceeded in the absence of the second and third defendants and made the recovery order.