HAMZA IJAZ v GHAFOOR MANAN

Meaning in a libel claim is determined by the single natural and ordinary meaning which a hypothetical reasonable reader would attribute to the publication, read as a whole and in context. The Chase levels provide a useful framework for distinguishing allegations of guilt, reasonable suspicion and grounds for investigation. The Jameel seriousness threshold is fact-sensitive and multifactorial. Relevant considerations include the gravity of the allegation, the form and extent of publication, the status of the publishees and publisher, whether the allegation was believed, and the publication’s transience. Even serious allegations may be struck out where the evidence shows that publication to the sole publishee caused no real and substantial harm to reputation.

The claimant, a dentist who had worked at the defendant’s dental practice, brought claims for breach of contract, libel and harassment. The judgment concerned preliminary issues in the libel claims. The court determined the meanings of five publications sent to the General Dental Council, the claimant’s father, HMRC and the claimant’s later employer.

A further issue was whether two texts sent to the claimant’s father constituted a serious and substantial tort for the purposes of the Jameel jurisdiction. The court heard evidence from the sole publishee, who said that he had not believed the allegations. The central questions were the natural and ordinary meanings of the publications and whether the two texts should be struck out for want of sufficient reputational harm.

1. Meaning. The court rejected the submission that it should merely decide whether the claimant’s pleaded meanings were correct. Having received full submissions on meaning, it determined the meanings itself as the efficient course consistent with the overriding objective (paras [3]–[5]). The applicable question was the single natural and ordinary meaning understood by a hypothetical reasonable reader, applying the principles summarised in [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) at [11]–[12]. Each publication had to be read in its entirety and in context, including the bane and antidote principle (paras [8]–[11]).
2. Chase levels. The three levels identified in [2003] EMLR 11 at [45] were a useful tool: an allegation of guilt, reasonable grounds to suspect guilt, and grounds to investigate. Applying that framework, the GDC publication bore a Chase level 2 meaning. The April text, May text and email to Envisage Dental bore Chase level 1 meanings. The HMRC referral bore a Chase level 3 meaning (paras [10]–[17]).
3. Jameel issue. The seriousness threshold was a multifactorial, fact-sensitive question to be approached in the light of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Relevant matters included the nature and gravity of the allegation, whether publication was oral or written, the status and number of publishees, whether the allegation was believed, the status of the publisher and the transience of the publication (paras [18]–[21]).
4. The April and May texts were serious and defamatory in themselves, but were sent only to the claimant’s father. The court accepted his evidence that, despite taking the texts seriously because they came from a senior professional, he did not believe the allegations and they caused no negative impact on his son’s reputation. There was therefore no real and substantial tort. The libel claims based on those texts were struck out on the Jameel basis (paras [22]–[24]).