Campbell v MGN Ltd

Meaning in a defamation claim is determined by the single natural and ordinary meaning which the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand, reading the publication as a whole and at the relevant speed. A possible less defamatory construction is not automatically preferred. Meaning and the fact/opinion distinction should ordinarily be assessed holistically, because each informs the other. An opinion piece may contain both assertions of fact and expressions of opinion. The court must identify which parts convey what the claimant did or said, and which parts convey evaluative comment. Extraneous material cannot inform natural and ordinary meaning unless it is properly pleaded and proved as known to the relevant readership.

The claimant brought a defamation claim concerning words published by the defendant in a Daily Mirror article and online on 19 November 2019. The words stated that the claimant had appeared on Breakfast TV to defend Jeffrey Epstein’s right to rape children and referred to her distinction between 14-year-old prostitutes and minors.

The claimant contended that the words meant she had appeared specifically to defend Epstein’s right to rape children. The defendant advanced a less extensive meaning and sought to justify it as true in substance and in fact. Nicklin J directed a trial of preliminary issues concerning the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and the extent to which they conveyed fact or opinion.

1. Preliminary issues determined. The court held that the words asserted as fact that the claimant appeared on a breakfast television programme to defend the rape of children by Epstein, and that her defence was based on the distinction between 14-year-old prostitutes and minors. The words also expressed the opinion that what she said was shocking and exemplified the sordid world of the entitled elite.
2. The natural and ordinary meaning was the meaning conveyed to the hypothetical reasonable reader. The reader would be expected to read the article quickly and without pedantic analysis. The article’s hard-hitting, scandal-focused context informed the meaning and resolved the grammatical ambiguity in favour of the claimant’s construction that “to defend” described the purpose of the appearance.
3. The court rejected the claimant’s formulation insofar as “for the specific purpose of” added an unnecessary shade of meaning, and insofar as “and did so” suggested that she asserted a general right to rape children. The natural meaning instead concerned the distinction she was said to have drawn.
4. The article was an opinion piece, but that did not make every statement opinion. The statements about what the claimant did, said and intended were assertions of fact. The evaluative character lay in the expressions of shock and the article’s wider characterisation of the entitled elite.
5. Material from the television programme was not admissible to determine natural and ordinary meaning. The detailed content had not been pleaded as general knowledge, no evidence established that it was known to readers, and no innuendo meaning was pleaded.
6. The parties were directed to amend their statements of case consequentially. The claimant was to re-amend her Particulars of Claim, after which the defendant was to consider its Defence and, where necessary, apply for permission to amend.

This was a first-instance trial of preliminary issues. The judgment records that on 16 February 2021 Nicklin J directed the trial concerning natural and ordinary meaning and fact or opinion.