Croyde Area Residents Association, R (On the Application Of) v North Devon District Council

A planning permission may be challenged notwithstanding a later certificate of lawfulness under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 192, because the statutory bar in s 284 protects the certificate, not the underlying permission. The certificate’s conclusive presumption is limited and may cease to operate following a material change, including the quashing of the permission on which the certificate depended.

Planning challenges brought outside the six-week period require a fact-sensitive assessment of promptness, prejudice, hardship and good administration. Although very late challenges will rarely succeed, time may be extended and relief granted in an exceptional case where the permission was plainly unlawful, remains unimplemented, causes serious planning harm, and the developer’s reliance losses are limited.

The claimant sought judicial review of a planning permission granted in 2014 for the operation of lodges, static caravans and touring caravans at a holiday park within an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The permission mistakenly included a substantially larger area than intended and was accepted by the local planning authority and the interested party to be unlawful.

In 2020, an inspector granted a certificate of lawfulness under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 195, concerning the stationing of caravans on part of the enlarged area. The interested party argued that s 284 barred any challenge to the underlying permission. The court had to decide whether the claim was barred, whether time should be extended, and whether relief should nevertheless be refused.

1. Jurisdiction. The statutory bar in Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 284, did not prevent a challenge to the planning permission underlying the certificate of lawfulness. On its wording, s 284 protected the certificate, not the separate planning permission. Extending the bar to the permission would extend the statutory language to a different legal document.
2. The certificate under s 192 created only a limited conclusive presumption of lawfulness. The reference to a material change before implementation could include the quashing of an earlier planning permission. The relevant use was the use specified in the certificate, namely the proposed use of the Service Field, and that use had not been implemented.
3. The challenge was brought well outside the six-week period. Applying the principles in R (Thornton Hall Hotel Ltd) v Wirral MBC [2019] P.T.S.R. 1794, the court considered each period of delay and balanced the developer’s interests, the claimant’s position and the interests of good administration. The first four years were reasonably justified because nobody, including the developer, understood the permission to have its eventual effect. The later delay was less satisfactory, but remained explicable in context.
4. The court gave substantial weight to the developer’s expenditure on the certificate application and appeal, but less weight to future profits, jobs and economic benefits arising from an unlawful windfall. The uncertainty resulting from quashing was materially less serious than the administrative harm identified in R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales, ex p Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738.
5. The permission was plainly unlawful, had not been implemented in its impugned aspect, and authorised potentially serious harm in an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The credibility of the planning system weighed heavily in favour of relief. Time was extended and the 2014 permission was quashed. Any further issue concerning relief was to be addressed by written submissions if not agreed.

Not stated in the judgment. This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court.