Allen v London Borough of Ealing

The service provisions in section 160 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 are permissive, not exhaustive or mandatory. A notice under section 82(6) may therefore be validly served by post on a body corporate at its registered or principal office, addressed simply to the body corporate. It need not also be addressed to the secretary, clerk, an officer in authority, or the department responsible for the matter. Alternatively, service may be effective under common law where the recipient has actual or ostensible authority to accept service. The statutory scheme should not be interpreted by imposing technical requirements inconsistent with its purpose of providing a simple and speedy remedy.

Ms Zoe Allen appealed by way of case stated from a decision of the District Judge of Ealing Magistrates’ Court dismissing her private prosecution concerning an alleged statutory nuisance caused by mice infestation in premises rented from the Council.

The District Judge held that the notice required by section 82(6) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 was invalid because it had been addressed to the London Borough of Ealing rather than to its secretary, clerk, or an identified person or department. The notice had been sent by recorded delivery to the Council’s principal office and signed for by an employee identified as Mark. The issues were whether section 160 prescribed mandatory methods of service and whether the notice was validly served either under section 160(2) or at common law.

1. Appeal allowed. The notice was validly served, and the District Judge’s dismissal of the complaint was wrong.

2. Section 160 uses permissive language. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) use “may”, in contrast with the mandatory “shall” in subsection (4). Reading subsection (3) as mandatory would create practical absurdities because many bodies corporate do not have an officer whose title is secretary or clerk. Section 160(4)(a), which refers to the proper address of both the body corporate and its secretary or clerk, also indicates that service on the body corporate itself is contemplated.

3. The statutory purpose supports that construction. Section 82 provides a simple and speedy remedy which may be used by lay people. An over-technical interpretation would frustrate that purpose. Section 160 assists the person serving the notice by providing safe methods of service; it does not impose an exhaustive code or make the complainant responsible for identifying the correct internal recipient.

4. The notice complied with section 160(2). The intended defendant was the Council itself, not its Housing Litigation Team or a particular officer. The notice was addressed to the London Borough of Ealing and posted to its principal office. Section 160(3)(a) did not impose an additional requirement to address it to the secretary or clerk. The Council’s prior request that notices be sent to its Housing Litigation Team did not alter the statutory position.

5. The court rejected the proposed additional requirement that a notice must identify someone in authority or the responsible department. A body corporate must maintain internal processes for redirecting correspondence addressed to it generally. The court did not decide whether service would be effective if deliberately addressed to a plainly inappropriate person.

6. There was also valid service at common law. On the evidence, Mark was an employee authorised, expressly or impliedly, to accept recorded-delivery correspondence on behalf of the Council. His receipt and signature therefore amounted to receipt by the Council.

7. The questions in the case stated were answered accordingly: section 160(2) and (3) are permissive, and proper service was proved both by posting the notice to the Council’s principal address and by its acceptance there by an authorised employee.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of case stated allowed. The District Judge’s dismissal of the private prosecution was overturned and the stated questions were answered in the appellant’s favour.