Rittson-Thomas and others v Oxfordshire County Council

Sections 2 and 14 of the School Sites Act 1841 form a coherent scheme and require a broad, practical and purposive interpretation. A school site does not cease to be used for the statutory purposes merely because the school moves before the site is sold. Section 14 permits a sale with vacant possession where, at all material times, the site is intended to be sold and the proceeds applied to another site or premises used, or to be used, for the same school.

The necessary intention must exist before or when the school permanently moves and when the former site is sold. A reverter requires a conceptually certain event. Evidential difficulty in identifying that event, including where it depends on intention, does not prevent certainty.

Land was conveyed to a county council under the School Sites Act 1841 for a school. The council later built improved premises on an adjacent site, moved the pupils there and sold almost all the original site. Its documented plan throughout was to use the sale proceeds towards the new premises.

The Deputy Judge dismissed the grantor's heirs' claim: [2018] EWHC 455 (Ch). The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the statutory reverter occurred when educational activity ended on the original site: [2019] EWCA Civ 200; [2019] Ch 435.

The central issue was whether section 14 permitted the trustees to move the school before selling the original site with vacant possession, or whether section 2 had already brought the statutory charitable trust to an end.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lady Arden and Lord Burrows delivered the joint judgment, with which Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales and Lord Stephens agreed. The original site did not cease to be used for the purposes of the School Sites Act 1841 when the school moved to the adjacent premises. No section 2 reverter was triggered.

2. Sections 2 and 14 must be read as a coherent whole. Following Fraser v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance (No 2) [2005] UKHL 65; [2006] 1 AC 377, both provisions require a broad and practical interpretation. That approach is also purposive and reflects the Act's operation through a statutory charitable trust. The court should lean towards continuation of the charitable educational purpose while respecting the balance struck between the grantor's interest and the public interest.

3. Section 14 contains no exclusion of a sale with vacant possession. Its reference to premises “used or to be used” for the trust permits the school to move before completion of the original site's sale. The statute imposes no rigid requirement that the original site be sold while pupils or ancillary school activities remain there.

4. The site does not cease to be used for the Act's purposes where, at all material times, it is considered advisable to sell it and, with the required consent, apply the proceeds to another site or to premises used or to be used for the same school. The intention to make that application must exist before or when the school permanently moves and when the former site is sold. Here the council's documented and continuing plan satisfied those requirements.

5. A reverter must be triggered by a conceptually certain event, such as permanent closure. The rule concerns certainty of concept rather than ease of proof. The occurrence and timing of permanent closure may depend on the intentions of those operating the school without turning the event into an impermissible process.

6. The Court of Appeal's decision was reversed and the first-instance dismissal of the heirs' claim was restored.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: The County Council's appeal was allowed unanimously. The decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed: [2021] UKSC 13 .

2. Court of Appeal: The heirs' appeal was allowed. The court held that the land had ceased to be used for the statutory purposes before its sale and that section 14 was no longer available: [2019] EWCA Civ 200 ; [2019] Ch 435.

3. High Court, Chancery Division: Richard Spearman QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, dismissed the claim. He held that section 14 did not require the original site to be sold before the school moved: [2018] EWHC 455 (Ch) .