HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY GENERAL v MR DAVID TAHERI

An Employment Appeal Tribunal may make a restriction of proceedings order under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 only if satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently, without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications. Repetition may concern similar claims against different respondents. Prior unchallenged tribunal findings may be relied upon, and withdrawal of a claim does not remove the vice of having launched an unmeritorious claim.

If the statutory conditions are met, the order remains discretionary. The tribunal must balance access to justice against protection of respondents, judicial resources and the administration of justice. An order is a filter, rather than an absolute bar, because permission may be sought for proceedings with reasonable grounds that are not abusive.

The Attorney General applied to the Employment Appeal Tribunal for an indefinite restriction of proceedings order against Mr Taheri under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.

Over approximately ten years, Mr Taheri had brought at least 41 Employment Tribunal claims, principally alleging discrimination after unsuccessful job applications. The history included claims struck out as vexatious or lacking reasonable prospects, claims discontinued after deposit orders or strike-out applications, settlements on unknown terms, and two unsuccessful merits hearings with costs orders.

The Attorney General relied on a pattern of substantial claims coupled with offers to settle for low sums, threats of publicity or regulatory complaints, and other conduct said to pressure prospective employers. Mr Taheri resisted the application, relying on his age, disability, Article 6 rights and the contention that he had genuinely sought employment. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions were met and, if so, whether an indefinite order was just.

1. Application granted. The statutory conditions in section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 were satisfied. Mr Taheri had habitually and persistently, without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious Employment Tribunal proceedings. An indefinite restriction of proceedings order was appropriate.

2. The requirement of habitual and persistent conduct was met by at least 41 claims over a decade. The claims resumed intensively after a gap and displayed a repeated pattern: similar discrimination allegations against prospective employers, substantial and unexplained compensation claims, and similar conduct during proceedings. The relatively recent pause in new claims did not support an inference that the conduct had ended, particularly given the pending application and outstanding claims.

3. The claims were brought without reasonable grounds. The EAT could rely on prior, unchallenged tribunal findings and could not revisit their correctness: Attorney General v Wheen [2001] IRLR 91. Claims struck out, claims abandoned after deposit orders, and the absence of any successful merits outcome supported that conclusion. A preliminary refusal to strike out a discrimination claim did not demonstrate that it had reasonable prospects, since strike-out is reserved for clear cases.

4. The proceedings were vexatious within the approach in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 2 FCR 1. They had little or no legal basis and imposed inconvenience, harassment and expense disproportionate to any likely gain. The evidence established use of the tribunal process to obtain nuisance-value settlements, reinforced by threats of adverse publicity or regulatory referral and other pressure on employers or their representatives.

5. The EAT exercised its discretion in favour of an indefinite order. Article 6 of the Convention required a balance, but access to the tribunal is not absolute. The order was necessary to protect the public and the administration of justice, while remaining a filter: Mr Taheri could seek permission to institute or continue proceedings, or make an application, where it had reasonable grounds and was not abusive.

Not applicable. This was the Attorney General’s original statutory application to the Employment Appeal Tribunal under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.