Attorney General v Sandra Messi

Under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, a restriction of proceedings order may be made where a person has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications. Vexatious litigation has little or no discernible legal basis and imposes disproportionate inconvenience, harassment or expense through misuse of the tribunal process.

The statutory conditions are assessed objectively. If they are met, the Employment Appeal Tribunal must exercise a discretion by balancing access to justice against protection of respondents and the effective administration of justice. An order is a judicial filter, not an absolute bar to meritorious proceedings. Section 33 does not empower the tribunal to prevent the subject of an order from acting as another person’s representative or McKenzie friend.

The Attorney General applied to the Employment Appeal Tribunal for an indefinite restriction of proceedings order against Ms Sandra Messi under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.

The evidence showed that, since 2017, Ms Messi had brought more than 50 Employment Tribunal claims against different employers. None had succeeded or settled. Claims and interim-relief applications had been struck out, dismissed, withdrawn, or rejected, and there was repeated non-compliance with directions and non-attendance at hearings.

Ms Messi alleged bias, fraud in the application process, incomplete evidence, and a disproportionate interference with her ability to bring genuine claims. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions for a restriction order were met and, if so, whether the tribunal should exercise its discretion to make one.

1. Application granted. The conditions in section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 were clearly met. Ms Messi had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings and made vexatious applications without any reasonable ground.

2. The tribunal applied the established meaning of vexatious proceedings. The extensive pattern of unsuccessful claims, defective interim-relief applications, withdrawals, non-attendance, and failure to comply with directions showed claims with little or no merit and an improper use of the tribunal process. The tribunal was entitled to rely on the underlying Employment Tribunal judgments and not revisit unappealed findings. Repetition against different employers could satisfy the statutory requirement of acting habitually and persistently.

3. The phrase “without any reasonable ground” required an objective assessment of whether there was a proper basis for the proceedings or applications. The materials showed no such basis. Repeated interim-relief applications contained defects previously explained to Ms Messi, so she knew, or was to be taken to know, that they would fail.

4. The tribunal rejected the allegations of apparent bias and fraud. The Solicitor General’s former professional association did not create a real possibility of bias. The earlier authorisation of the application did not require the supporting affidavit already to have been signed.

5. Having found the statutory conditions fulfilled, the tribunal exercised its discretion to impose an order. The substantial burden on respondents, the tribunals and the court system outweighed the interference with Ms Messi’s prima facie right of access to a court. The order was proportionate because it imposed a judicial permission filter and did not prevent a potentially meritorious claim proceeding.

6. The order was made indefinitely in the terms prescribed by section 33. The tribunal declined to restrict Ms Messi from acting as a representative or McKenzie friend. Section 33 contained no jurisdiction to make such an order and, in any event, there was no evidence that she had acted in that capacity so as to obstruct justice.

not stated in the judgment.