Hubert Howard (deceased) (substituted by Maresha Howard Rose) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The statutory good-character requirement for naturalisation is distinct from residence, integration, language and knowledge-of-life requirements. Long residence and integration may explain relaxation of the latter requirements, but do not logically require relaxation of good-character guidance. The Secretary of State may rationally apply the same good-character approach to all applicants, including members of the Windrush generation. Whether to adopt a more lenient policy is a discretionary policy choice, not a course required by the Windrush statement. Judicial review should be slow to interfere with such policy judgments absent irrationality.

Mr Hubert Howard, a member of the Windrush generation, applied for naturalisation as a British citizen. His application was refused because of the good-character requirement, principally because of a recent suspended sentence for common assault. He was later granted citizenship, but the proceedings continued after his death and substitution of his daughter under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

Swift J held that the refusals were unlawful because the Secretary of State had irrationally applied the general good-character guidance without modification for the Windrush generation. The Secretary of State appealed. The central issue was whether the Windrush statement logically required a more lenient approach to good character.

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration that the refusal decisions were unlawful.

1. Meaning of the Windrush statement. Its general references to members of the Windrush generation being deserving of British citizenship could not reasonably be understood as guaranteeing citizenship regardless of criminal behaviour. The specific waivers concerned fees and the language and life-in-the-UK requirements, not good character.
2. No logical mismatch. Long residence and integration are conceptually distinct from good character. They directly explain why the language and life-in-the-UK requirements might be treated as satisfied. They do not bear directly on a person’s propensity to criminal or antisocial conduct. It was therefore not irrational to modify some requirements without modifying the good-character guidance.
3. Policy discretion. Under section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981, assessment of good character is entrusted to the Secretary of State. Whether to apply the same approach to all applicants, despite particularly deserving circumstances, is a policy matter with which the court should be very slow to interfere. A more lenient approach was possible, but it was not the only rational option.
4. Unresolved statutory point. The court noted that paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 may impose an absolute good-character requirement which cannot be waived. It also noted the possible argument that only evidence bearing on character may be considered. That point was not necessary to the decision and was left undecided.

The decision did not diminish the recognition that Mr Howard had been seriously wronged by the hostile environment. The appeal concerned only whether the Secretary of State had been obliged to relax the good-character requirement.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) ([2022] EWCA Civ 1068, 27 July 2022): allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and set aside the declaration of unlawfulness.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court (Swift J, decision handed down 23 April 2021): allowed the judicial review and declared the refusal decisions unlawful.