Taryn Baptie v The Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames

In an intentional-homelessness affordability assessment, reasonable living expenses are the sum an applicant reasonably requires to provide the necessities of life to a minimum standard. Evidence of reasonable minimum costs, including evidence-based non-statutory guidance, may be considered. The benefit cap must be included when calculating available income, but need not automatically be used again as a stage-two benchmark. Universal Credit standard allowances are permissive guidance under the 2018 Code, not a mandatory benchmark in every case. An appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 is supervisory. The court must not conduct a merits review of a multifactorial assessment absent public-law error.

The Council decided that Taryn Baptie had become intentionally homeless after losing her rented accommodation through rent arrears. The reviewing officer concluded that her income was sufficient to meet both the rent and the family’s reasonable living expenses, relying substantially on 2019 guidance issued by the Association of Housing Advice Services.

On appeal under the Housing Act 1996, HHJ Hellman held that reliance on the AHAS guidance was irrational and that the benefit cap should have been used as a sanity check. He varied the decision so that the Council was subject to the full housing duty. The Council’s second appeal concerned the proper assessment of reasonable living expenses, the relevance of the benefit cap and Universal Credit allowances, the supervisory role of the court, and whether the County Court should have remitted the matter.

Appeal allowed. Warby LJ gave the leading judgment, with Asplin and Jackson LJJ agreeing.

1. Under Article 2 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 1996 and the 2018 Code, affordability concerns what the applicant reasonably requires to meet the household’s essential needs apart from housing costs. Reasonable living costs are therefore the sum needed to provide life’s necessities to a minimum standard. The inquiry is not determined by the applicant’s actual spending or by average prices alone. Patel v Hackney LBC [2021] EWCA Civ 897 supported that approach.
2. The Judge had misdirected himself by treating the AHAS guidance as legally irrelevant because it identified reasonable minimum costs. Evidence-based guidance of that kind was capable of being objective and reliable. The 2019 guidance was based on researched London prices and had not been shown to be unreliable. The reviewing officer was entitled to take it into account.
3. Samuels v Birmingham City Council [2019] UKSC 98 did not decide that AHAS guidance was unreliable or legally unusable. Its benchmark conclusion arose from the 2006 Code and the absence of other objective guidance in that case. The wider discussion in Samuels did not form part of its essential reasoning.
4. The benefit cap had to be included at the first stage because it affected the income available to the applicant. It did not automatically have to be used again at the second stage as a benchmark or sanity check for reasonable living expenses. The 2018 Code permitted, but did not mandate, reliance on Universal Credit standard allowances. Those allowances could not be treated as uncapped total benefits for a large family.
5. Appeals under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 are supervisory. The court must not conduct a merits review of a multifactorial assessment where the officer considered relevant material and reached a conclusion open in public-law terms. The reviewer’s use of a November 2017 snapshot and adjustment to six dependants, following the applicant’s own representation, was not irrational.
6. The reviewing officer’s decision was not unlawful. The County Court order was set aside and the appeal to the County Court was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Council’s second appeal, set aside HHJ Hellman’s order, and substituted an order dismissing the appeal to the County Court.
2. County Court at Central London: HHJ Hellman allowed Ms Baptie’s statutory appeal, held the affordability decision unlawful, and varied the decision to one that she had not become intentionally homeless.