R v Harry Bowman

When an adult is sentenced for offences committed as a child, the court must apply the sentencing principles for children and young people to culpability at the time of offending. If youth and immaturity reduced culpability, the passage of time does not increase it. The court should consider the maximum sentence available and the sentence likely to have been imposed then. Youth and mental health difficulties must receive sufficient combined weight in assessing totality. For offences under sections 9 or 10 and 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, an offender under 18 is subject to the five-year statutory maximum, and guilty-plea credit must be reflected.

The appellant appealed by leave of a single judge against a total sentence of 14 years' detention in a young offender institution for 25 sexual offences against seven victims. Most offences were committed when he was aged between 14 and 17; the offences against the final victim were committed after he had become an adult.

The sentencing judge imposed the sentence on 24 September 2021. The appeal challenged the weight given to youth, mental health difficulties, guilty-plea credit, delay and totality. The central issues were the correct approach to sentencing offences committed as a child and whether the total sentence was excessive.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The total sentence of 14 years was manifestly excessive. The appropriate total sentence was 10 years' detention in a young offender institution.
2. Following R v Limon [2022] EWCA Crim 39, where an adult is sentenced for offences committed as a child, the court must apply the children and young people sentencing principles. Reduced culpability arising from youth and immaturity is assessed at the time of offending and is not increased merely by the passage of time. The court must consider the maximum sentence available and the sentence likely to have been imposed at that time.
3. The appellant's youth was important mitigation, although his age at many offences, the seriousness and persistence of the offending, offending after arrest and offending against the final victim as an adult had to be considered. His mental health difficulties were also important. They did not remove culpability, but his autistic condition limited his ability to recognise others' emotions and perhaps the seriousness of the harm caused.
4. For offences contrary to sections 9 or 10 and 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the maximum sentence was five years where the offender was under 18, rather than 14 years for an adult. The five-year sentences imposed on the relevant counts therefore failed to reflect the appellant's guilty pleas.
5. At the appellate stage, the principal concern was the totality of the sentence rather than its precise structure. The sentencing judge had given insufficient weight to the combined effect of youth and mental health difficulties. The sentences on the specified minor counts were left unchanged but made concurrent, producing two years. The sentences on counts 9, 12, 13 and 18 were quashed and replaced by two years each, concurrent. Two years on count 25 and two years on count 29 were made consecutive, and count 33 was replaced by four years consecutive. Ancillary orders remained unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Appeal by leave of a single judge allowed in part. The total sentence was reduced to 10 years' detention: [2022] EWCA Crim 1206.
• Sentencing judge — On 24 September 2021, imposed a total sentence of 14 years' detention in a young offender institution. No lower-court citation is stated in the judgment.