Regina v Jacob Talbot-Lummis

When sentencing a child or young person, the court must have regard to the principal aim of youth justice and the child’s welfare. The approach must be individualised and child-focused, with immaturity and developmental difficulties considered in assessing culpability.

In an exceptionally grave case, the court may use the sentence for a mature adult as a reference point. The Children guideline’s half-to-two-thirds indication for 15-to-17-year-olds is only a rough, non-mechanical guide. Emotional and developmental maturity is at least as important as chronological age. Material mitigation must be reflected in the sentence. Where lesser and more serious charges are alternatives, conviction of the more serious charge requires the lesser charge to lie on file rather than attract a separate penalty.

The appellant, aged 15 years and 8 months when he committed the offences, was convicted of attempted murder and possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. The sentencing judge imposed an extended determinate sentence of 29 years on the attempted murder count, a concurrent sentence of 12 years on the firearm count, and no separate penalty on an alternative firearm charge to which the appellant had pleaded guilty.

By leave of the single judge, the appellant appealed against sentence. The issues included the notional adult sentence, the reduction required for youth and immaturity, the finding of dangerousness, and the legality of imposing no separate penalty on the alternative charge.

The appeal was allowed to the extent stated. The sentences were quashed and substituted, and the alternative charge was ordered to lie on file.

1. Alternative charges. Where an offender pleads guilty to the lesser of two alternative charges but is convicted of the more serious charge, the court should sentence only for the more serious offence. The lesser charge should lie on file and should not attract a separate penalty. The court relied on R v Cole (1965) 49 Cr App R 199 and R v Ismail [2019] EWCA Crim 290.
2. Sentencing children. Under section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 and section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, the court must have regard to the principal aim of the youth justice system and the welfare of the child. The approach is individualistic and child-focused. Immaturity and emotional difficulties may diminish culpability.
3. Adult sentence and youth reduction. In an unusually grave case, the court may identify the sentence appropriate for a mature adult and then make an appropriate reduction under paragraph 6.46 of the Children guideline. The half-to-two-thirds indication for offenders aged 15 to 17 is only a rough guide and must not be applied mechanically. Emotional and developmental maturity is at least as important as chronological age. There was no basis for treating the appellant as more mature than others of his age, so the sentence should have been closer to one-half than two-thirds of the notional adult sentence.
4. Aggravation and mitigation. Planning and premeditation may remain highly significant where a young offender has formed a clear plan and taken substantial steps to execute it. However, the court must fairly balance that aggravation against material mitigation. The evidence of depressive disorder and associated emotional difficulties had not been sufficiently reflected. The appropriate notional adult sentence was therefore reduced from 36 to 34 years.
5. The substituted sentence was an extended determinate sentence of 23 years on count 1, comprising 18 years’ custody and an extended licence period of 5 years, and a concurrent standard determinate sentence of 9 years’ detention on count 3. Count 4 was ordered to lie on file, with no sentence imposed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The appellant appealed against sentence by leave of the single judge. The appeal was allowed to the stated extent, the sentences were quashed and substituted, and the alternative charge was ordered to lie on file: [2022] EWCA Crim 400.