REGINA v AJAY STEPHENS

Under section 3(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, the prosecution must prove that each specified ground formed part of the reason for choosing the person for the exploitative purpose. In a case concerning a child, it is sufficient that youth was one reason for the choice and that an adult would probably refuse to be so used. Those need not be the only reasons.

The reference to an adult is a general reference to a person over 18. It does not require a counterfactual assessment of the particular child as an adult retaining that child’s other characteristics. The same construction applies to the other vulnerabilities listed in section 3(6).

The applicant pleaded guilty to drug-supply offences and was convicted at Inner London Crown Court of two offences of arranging or facilitating the travel of children with a view to exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The prosecution alleged that he operated a county-lines drug operation and used vulnerable children to supply drugs in Hastings.

The jury asked whether the reference in section 3(6)(b) to an adult likely to refuse meant an average adult, rather than an adult with the individual characteristics of the child. The judge directed that adult meant a person over 18 and did not require that individualised comparison. The applicant renewed his application for permission to appeal against conviction, contending that the direction misstated the statutory test.

1. Permission to appeal against conviction was refused. Permission to appeal against sentence, sought only contingently, was also refused.
2. The issue was one of ordinary statutory construction. The language of section 3(6)(b) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 does not require the court to import the particular characteristics of the child into the description of an adult. The provision is clear without those additional words.
3. Section 3(6) requires proof that both specified grounds formed part of the reason for choosing the person. In a child case, the person must have been chosen in part because they were a child and because an adult would probably refuse to be used for the relevant purpose. Those need only be factors in the choice; other reasons, including a child’s criminal history, do not prevent the statutory condition being met.
4. The court followed R v Karamera [2019] Cr App R 14 as confirming the protective purpose of the provision and the fact that the two statutory grounds need not be the sole reasons for the choice. The statutory purpose is to protect vulnerable people from trafficking for exploitation.
5. The first limb asks whether the person was chosen on the ground that they were a child, not whether every individual characteristic of that child was causative. The second limb asks whether an adult, meaning a person over 18, would be likely to refuse. The same approach applies to the other listed vulnerabilities.
6. The judge’s answer to the jury’s question accurately stated that construction. The jury were entitled to find that youth formed part of the reason for choosing the two boys concerned. The renewed application disclosed no arguable merit.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2022] EWCA Crim 410, the court refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction and the contingent application concerning sentence.
• Inner London Crown Court — The applicant was convicted on 7 May 2021 of two offences under sections 2(1) and 3(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. On 11 November 2021 he received a total sentence of eight years and three months’ imprisonment. No lower-court citation was stated.