R v Chalk & R v Chaplin

A Crown Court judge exercising powers under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 has only the powers available to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). Once a case has been sent or committed to the Crown Court, the Magistrates’ Court is functus officio. The Criminal Procedure Rules cannot cure an act done without jurisdiction. An indicated guilty plea may support committal for sentence. An incorrect statutory reference does not necessarily invalidate a committal. A guilty plea may be vacated before sentence on the relevant count. Pleas-in-bar do not extinguish the underlying offence or remove jurisdiction. Where an intended child victim is an adult undercover officer, the substantive child-sex offences cannot be committed; the proper charges are attempts.

These were two separate sentence challenges heard together because both raised technical questions about Crown Court judges sitting as District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts). Chalk had indicated a guilty plea in the Magistrates’ Court and was committed for sentence, but the Crown Court judge later treated the matter as having been sent for trial and purported to correct the position under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003. Chaplin pleaded guilty to substantive child-sex offences, although the supposed child was an adult undercover police officer. The Crown Court judge later purported to withdraw those charges, accept pleas to attempts and commit the attempts for sentence. The central issues were whether those procedural steps were lawful and what effect any unlawfulness had on the sentences.

Disposition. The court quashed the unlawful procedural steps and sentence relating to one Chalk count, imposed no separate penalty for that count, clarified activation of his suspended sentences, and refused Chaplin’s renewed application for permission to appeal.

1. The overriding objective in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 cannot alter substantive jurisdiction or cure an act done without jurisdiction. The court applied Hubner v District Court of Prostejov, Czech Republic [2009] EWHC 2929 (Admin) and the jurisdictional analysis in R v Gould [2021] EWCA Crim 447.
2. Section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 gives a Crown Court judge only the same powers as a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). Once the Magistrates’ Court has validly sent a defendant for trial or committed the defendant for sentence, it is functus officio. The Crown Court cannot use section 66 to make an order which the Magistrates’ Court could no longer make or to quash an irregular order. A Divisional Court may quash an unlawful order, while the Crown Court may lay and commit a new charge in the correct form.
3. In Chalk’s case, an indication of a guilty plea was treated under section 17A(6) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 as sufficient for the offence to be lawfully committed for sentence. The Crown Court judge therefore had no jurisdiction to act as a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). The purported sending under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the resulting 24-week sentence, were quashed. The court applied R v Jex [2021] EWCA Crim 1708 in holding that the mistaken reference to the former sentencing provision did not invalidate the original committal.
4. In Chaplin’s case, the Magistrates’ Court had validly committed the substantive charges and was functus officio. The sentencing judge, sitting as a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts), could accept pleas to the properly framed attempts and commit them for sentence. The availability of autrefois convict did not itself invalidate the new charges. The court distinguished R v Manchester Crown Court ex parte Hill (1985) 149 JP 257, approved the actual decision in R v Jessemey [2021] EWCA Crim 175, but regarded its wider statement about alternative attempt convictions as requiring further consideration. Citing both the substantive offence and the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 was identified as better practice.
5. At common law, a guilty plea may be vacated before sentence on the relevant count. The Crown Court could vacate Chaplin’s two pleas because the offences had been committed for sentence and no sentence had been passed. The requirement for a written application under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 was waived. The pleas were vacated, the substantive charges were remitted to the Magistrates’ Court, and discontinuance notices were to be issued.
6. The court upheld Chalk’s substantive sentence as not manifestly excessive. Repeated domestic abuse within a relationship is not less serious because the relationship continues and may be more serious because of its repetition. The activation of the suspended sentences was clarified by reducing each of the four terms by one week. No separate penalty was imposed for the quashed count. Chaplin’s renewed application was refused, the court agreeing with the single judge that the sentence and decision to proceed without a psychiatric report disclosed no arguable error.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — heard Chalk’s appeal and Chaplin’s renewed application together and delivered judgment at [2022] EWCA Crim 433.
• Crown Court at Exeter — sentenced Chalk to an aggregate term of imprisonment, including a sentence on the count later found to have been unlawfully dealt with under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003.
• Crown Court at Ipswich — sentenced Chaplin on the attempt charges and related offences, later varying the extended licence period to comply with the statutory maximum.