Regina v Robert Cameron Wells

For a discretionary common-law life sentence, the court must first decide whether the offence gravity warrants life imprisonment and then whether the offender may remain a danger to the public for an uncertain period. An extended determinate sentence is not sufficient where eventual release would fail to provide adequate public protection. In assessing the minimum term, the court must apply totality across the present and earlier offending. It must make proper allowance for custody already served for similar offending, including offending against the same victim. An unlawful life sentence must be quashed and replaced with a lawful determinate sentence.

The appellant appealed against life sentences with a 17-year minimum term imposed for 19 historical sexual offences. The sentencing judge imposed life sentences for two rapes and, unlawfully, for four offences carrying a maximum of 10 years. The judge also imposed concurrent determinate sentences for three other offences and no separate penalty for the remaining counts.

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of the four life sentences, the assessment of dangerousness and the length of the minimum term. He relied on his age, the absence of further offending and sentences already served for related offences. The central issues were whether life imprisonment was justified, whether an extended sentence would adequately protect the public, and how totality should affect the minimum term.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed in part. The life sentences on counts 1, 6, 9 and 17 were unlawful because each offence carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. They were quashed and replaced by concurrent determinate sentences of eight years on count 1 and 10 years on counts 6, 9 and 17.
2. Life sentences for rape. The two-stage test for a discretionary common-law life sentence, identified in Attorney-General's Reference No 32 of 199 (R v Whittaker) [1997] 1 Cr App R(S) 261 and R v Chapman [2000] 1 Cr App R(S) 377, was satisfied. The gravity of the rapes, viewed with the associated offending and the wider offending, warranted a severe sentence. The appellant could remain a danger for an uncertain period despite his age. His overall offending, lack of remorse, unwillingness to admit guilt and refusal to provide access to concealed digital files supported that conclusion.
3. An extended determinate sentence had been implicitly considered. It would not provide sufficient protection because the appellant would eventually have been released whether or not he remained dangerous. The life sentences for the rapes were therefore justified and were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
4. Minimum term and totality. The judge had to consider the overall sentence that would have been imposed if all the offending had been dealt with together. That exercise required allowance for the periods already spent in custody for similar offending, including offending against C4. The failure to make sufficient allowance rendered the 17-year minimum term manifestly excessive. The proper notional determinate sentence, after totality, was 28 years, producing substituted minimum terms of 14 years on each rape count.
5. The appellant remained subject to a life sentence. He had to serve a minimum term of 14 years from 6 September 2021, less 323 days spent on remand, before release on licence could be considered. The other sentences and the absence of separate penalties on the remaining counts were unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2022] EWCA Crim 752. The court allowed the appeal in part, quashed four unlawful life sentences, substituted determinate sentences for those counts, and reduced the minimum term on the two rape counts from 17 years to 14 years.
• Crown Court: The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 17 years on two rape counts and four other counts, with concurrent determinate sentences on three counts. The judgment does not state the Crown Court case citation.