REGINA v JASON WRAY

A trader cannot rely on rapid business growth as mitigation where he accepts deposits knowing that he cannot perform work properly or within a reasonable time, then continues misleading customers. Repeated conduct affecting several consumers may demonstrate high culpability and pass the custody threshold.

Strong personal mitigation must receive genuine weight separately from the guilty-plea reduction. Suspension remains primarily a matter for the sentencing judge’s discretion. Appellate intervention requires an error of principle or failure to consider an important relevant matter.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Sheffield to one count of engaging in an unfair commercial practice, contrary to Regulation 8(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. Four customers suffered incomplete and defective building work, substantial financial losses and serious personal consequences. On 4 March 2022, the judge imposed nine months’ imprisonment.

The appellant appealed with leave, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive and should have been suspended. He relied on his effective good character, work history, personal mitigation and low risk of reoffending. The issues were the appropriate custodial term and whether immediate custody was justified.

1. Custody threshold and culpability. The custody threshold was plainly passed. The appellant had undertaken work and taken substantial deposits while aware of his financial instability and inability to perform the work properly or within a reasonable time. The Court rejected the suggestion that he was merely overwhelmed by business success. Taking further work, misleading successive customers, retaining deposits and continuing the conduct as difficulties multiplied could amount to criminal behaviour and was a point against him rather than mitigation.
2. Mitigation and re-sentencing. The appellant’s previous good character, positive references, charity work, sound working history, family impact, limited remorse and the delay before sentence were strong mitigating factors. The judge had identified a separate 20 per cent reduction for the guilty plea, but had reduced a 12-month starting point to nine months overall. That left only a nominal reduction for the remaining mitigation, which was plainly inadequate. The Court therefore re-sentenced the appellant, reducing the starting point to eight months for personal mitigation and applying the 20 per cent guilty-plea discount. The appropriate sentence was six months’ imprisonment.
3. Suspension. Whether to suspend a custodial sentence is primarily a matter for the sentencing judge’s discretion. The Court may interfere only for an error of law or principle, or failure to take an important relevant matter into account. The judge had considered the applicable guidelines and relevant factors, and was entitled to conclude that only immediate custody adequately reflected the needless misery caused to several victims over many months. The refusal to suspend was neither unlawful nor disproportionate.
4. The nine-month sentence was quashed and replaced with six months’ imprisonment. The sentence was not suspended.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2022] EWCA Crim 804, the appeal against sentence was allowed in part. The nine-month term was quashed and replaced with six months, without suspension.
• Crown Court at Sheffield: Following the guilty plea, the appellant was sentenced on 4 March 2022 to nine months’ imprisonment.