SVANTE KUMLIN & Anor v CAMILLA JONSSON & Ors

On a jurisdiction challenge to an online libel claim under Article 7(2) of the Brussels Recast Regulation, the claimant must establish a good arguable case on each element of the domestic tort, including publication, defamatory meaning and serious harm. The test has three limbs: a plausible evidential basis; an interim assessment where the court can reliably make one; and, where reliable assessment is impossible, a plausible contested basis.

The centre-of-interests jurisdiction is available only if jurisdiction exists under domestic law in the first place. A claimant with diffuse international connections may have no centre of interests, and habitual residence remains the starting point. Under Marinari, indirect financial loss in England and Wales does not confer jurisdiction where the direct reputational damage occurred abroad.

The claimants brought libel proceedings concerning eight Swedish-language articles published by the defendants on a Swedish business news website. The defendants, all Swedish, applied under CPR Part 11 for a declaration that the court lacked jurisdiction or should not exercise it.

The court considered whether the claimants had a good arguable case that the articles were defamatory and had caused serious harm; whether the claimants could rely on the centre-of-interests jurisdiction for global damages and non-pecuniary relief; and whether Swedish law would defeat parts of the claims.

The central issues were whether there was jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels Recast Regulation, and, if so, whether the First Claimant had England and Wales as his centre of interests.

1. Good arguable case. The burden lay on the claimants for both jurisdictional questions. The applicable standard was the three-limb test stated in Brownlie, reaffirmed in Goldman Sachs and explained in Kaefer. The court must identify a plausible evidential basis, take a reliable interim view where possible, and otherwise assess whether the contested evidence provides a plausible basis.
2. First Claimant. Articles 2, 6 and 8 gave the First Claimant a good arguable case of defamatory meaning and serious harm. Serious harm could be inferred from the gravity of allegations of dishonesty, sham transactions, defrauding creditors and destruction of evidence, together with the evidence of readership, percolation and the importance of the publishees. The assessment was made separately for each article.
3. Second Claimant. The Second Claimant failed to establish a good arguable case. Under Marinari, Article 7(2) does not extend to indirect financial loss in a state where the direct reputational damage occurred elsewhere. The evidence pointed to publication, inquiry and decision-making abroad in relation to the Pareto mandate. There were also substantial causation difficulties and limited evidence that the holding company itself traded for profit or suffered serious financial loss.
4. Centre of interests. The First Claimant failed to show that England and Wales displaced Monaco, his habitual residence, as his centre of interests. His business and personal interests were internationally diffuse, and the relevant publications concerned Swedish matters on a Swedish-language website. He could therefore claim only local damages for publication in England and Wales and could not claim internet relief having effect outside England and Wales.
5. Disposition. The Second Claimant’s claim failed for want of jurisdiction. The First Claimant’s claim was limited to local damages. The issue of applying Swedish law did not arise. The parties were invited to draw up an order reflecting the judgment.

First-instance jurisdiction decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.