Alexander Lewis-Ranwell v G4S Health Services (UK) Limited & Ors

The illegality defence requires the defendant to identify criminal or quasi-criminal conduct engaging the public interest. A claimant’s deliberate act is insufficient if insanity meant that he did not know the act was wrong and therefore bore no criminal responsibility. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is fundamentally different from diminished-responsibility manslaughter. A hospital and restriction order following insanity is a protective disposal, not punishment for a criminal act. The narrow rule barring recovery for loss caused by a criminal sentence therefore does not apply. The claim was allowed to proceed because permitting a negligence claim based on a third party’s alleged breach would not create incoherence between criminal and civil law.

The claimant brought negligence and Human Rights Act 1998 claims against healthcare, police and local-authority defendants concerning his treatment and release from custody shortly before he killed three men. He had been acquitted of murder and manslaughter by reason of insanity and detained under a hospital order with restrictions.

The First, Third and Fourth Defendants applied under CPR r3.4(2)(a) to strike out the common-law negligence claims on the ground of ex turpi causa. The central issue was whether the claimant’s insanity verdict and subsequent detention prevented him from relying on the defendants’ alleged negligence.

1. Application and governing principles. The applications concerned only the negligence claims. The pleaded facts were assumed to be true. The court applied the modern illegality authorities, including Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 and Stoffel v Grondona [2020] UKSC 42. The doctrine protects the integrity and coherence of the legal system and prevents a claimant profiting from wrongdoing.
2. Turpitude and responsibility. The defendants had to establish criminal or quasi-criminal conduct engaging the public interest. A deliberate act alone was insufficient. The claimant had to know that what he was doing was wrong. His verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity established that he lacked that essential element of criminal responsibility. The distinction from diminished-responsibility manslaughter was fundamental: responsibility is reduced in the latter case but eliminated in the former.
3. Effect of the disposal. The hospital and restriction orders made under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 were protective measures arising from mental illness, not criminal punishment. The narrow rule discussed in Gray v Thames Trains [2009] 3 WLR 167, which bars recovery for loss resulting from a sentence imposed for a criminal act for which the claimant was responsible, therefore did not apply.
4. Policy and proportionality. The claim did not enable the claimant to profit from wrongdoing because the insanity verdict excluded criminal wrongdoing. Nor would it produce inconsistency between criminal and civil law. The alleged negligence could be the substantial cause of the injury or loss, while the claimant’s insanity prevented blameworthiness attaching to him. No deterrent or public-confidence consideration justified extending the defence, and proportionality did not arise.
5. Disposition. The First, Third and Fourth Defendants’ applications to strike out the negligence claims were dismissed. The substantive issues of duty, breach, causation and loss remained for trial.